Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-031 *15 February 1995*

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Names of 21 Bosnian Serbs Indicted for War Crimes

AU1302155495 Paris AFP in English 1514 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Feb 13 (AFP)—Herewith the names of the 21 Bosnian Serbs indicted Monday by The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

They are charged with war crimes and related war atrocities in ex-Yugoslavia.

—Dusan "Dusko" Tadic and Goran Borovnica, both charged with committing atrocities at the Omarska detention camp in Prijedor, northwest Bosnia, and other camps

—Zeljko Meakic, alias Mejakic or Meagic, commander of the Omarska camp

—Miroslav Kvocka and Dragoljub Prcac, two of Meakic's deputies at the camp

—Mladen "Krkan" Radic

—Milojica "Krle" Kos

—Momcilo Gruban, alias "Ckalja" (team leaders or "shift commanders")

—Zdravko Govedarica

—Gruban (first name not given)

—Predrag Kostic, alias "Kole"

—Nedeljko Paspalj

—Milan Pavlic

—Milutin Popovic

—Drazenko Predojevic

—Zeljko Savic (camp guards)

—Mirko Babic

—Nikica Janjic

—Dusan Knezevic, alias "Buca"

—Dragomir Saponja

—Zoran Zigic, alias Ziga (part-time camp staff)

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Videnov: Bulgaria Not Ready To Hold Conference

AU1502110895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Report by Lilyana Mikhaylova on news conference by Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The prime minister discussed many issues prompted by the journalists' questions and which had to do with all spheres of our life. [passage omitted]

At the end of his news conference, Mr. Videnov took a stand on a foreign policy issue. Asked about the proposal that President Zhelev made in the United States to organize a Balkan conference in Sofia, Mr. Videnov said that Bulgaria is not ready to organize such a large-scale Balkan diplomatic initiative, regardless of the fact that it is the opinion of the government, coalition, and ruling majority that Bulgaria must restore its natural role in reviving the all-Balkan process that has been suspended since the end of the 1980s.

Mr. Videnov said that months of intensive work would be needed to prepare such an initiative and that his cabinet will make efforts in this direction.

BSP To Hold All-Party Conference in 1995

AU1402151195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the regular weekly news conference of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] that took place today, Nikolay Dobrev talked about the plenum of the BSP Supreme Council that took place on 11 February, at which the matter of the accountability reports and elections in the party was discussed.

As is well known, it has been decided to hold an all-party conference in the second half of the year at which the political situation in the country will be discussed, the activity of the cabinet assessed, and a party position on regional and local policy adopted.

Accountability-election conferences should take place prior to the all-party conference. Mr. Dobrev pointed out that according to the decision of the BSP plenum, each party organization will assess whether to hold only an accountability or an accountability-election conference.

Boris Kolev from the Ecoglasnost Political Club, the BSP's coalition partner, announced that the parliamentary faction will insist on the priority discussion of two draft bills in parliament during the current week: the Environment Protection Bill and the Bill on Amendments and Addenda to the Bill on Property and Use of Agrarian Land.

The Democratic Left parliamentary faction will today discuss the faction's legislative priorities and elect two additional deputy chairmen of the parliamentary faction and a secretary.

SDS Council Schedules National Conference

AU1402184395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Coordinating Council of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] today decided to hold an SDS national conference on 29 and 30 April. The local elections will be the main topic of discussion. The conference will also discuss proposed changes to the SDS statutes.

The National Coordinating Council also accepted a report on the 1994 parliamentary elections for information purposes. According to National Coordinating Council Chairman Ivan Kostov, the report is a frank one and does not confirm the finding that the SDS does not possess local structures capable of conducting the election campaign at the level achieved by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. The SDS will work to win a leading position in the united opposition.

Democratic Left Elects More Leaders

AU1402182195 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Report by Lilyana Yancheva]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Left Parliamentary Group at its meeting today elected more members to its leadership. The group elected Aleksandur Marinov and Dragomir Shopov as deputy chairmen. It also elected Emiliya Tomova as secretary responsible for organizational matters and Klara Marinova as secretary responsible for contacts with the mass media.

At the moment, the group is voting on candidates to represent the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group in international organizations and forums.

The group discussed in detail the bill on amendments and additions to the Farmland Ownership and Use Act, but adopted no decision. The group will meet again tomorrow before the plenary session of the National Assembly to discuss this bill further and adopt a resolution.

This evening the group is meeting to consider its tasks in connection with the National Assembly's legislative agenda and ministers' question time this week.

Commander of Navy Dies 'After Long Illness'

AU1502100895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The following is an announcement of the Defense Ministry Press Center: This morning at the Varna Naval Hospital, Vice Admiral Ventsislav Velkov, commander of the Bulgarian Navy, died after a long illness.

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Havel Views NATO Expansion, Two-Speed Europe

AU1502074895 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Feb 95 pp 136-138

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by Joachim Preuss and Olaf Ihlau in Prague; date not given: "Danger of a New Yalta"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, NATO is pursuing a double strategy toward East Europe and Russia: Even though Moscow is not to have the right to veto the Alliance's expansion to the East, it is wanted as a strategic partner. Will the East Europeans remain behind in this process?

[Havel] Russia really does not have any right to tell the North Atlantic Alliance whom it should accept and whom it should not. NATO does not tell Russia, either, who may belong to CIS. Nevertheless, a strategic partnership with Russia is unavoidable so as to deepen mutual trust. Against this background, the Alliance should expand to the East. Now they have waited long enough to do that.

[DER SPIEGEL] The current security vacuum in Central and East Europe must be eliminated as quickly as possible?

[Havel] History tells us that stability in all of Europe is in danger without peace and stability in Central Europe. The logical and natural overcoming of this security vacuum is the acceptance of the East and Central European countries into NATO. This serves not only our interests but also those of the West. This would expand the zone of stability; the Russians must understand that NATO's expansion is not directed against them.

[DER SPIEGEL] How is NATO's expansion to the East supposed to take place, step by step or in one go?

[Havel] I will beware of giving advice to the Alliance. This depends on its own strategic calculations and on the qualification of the respective candidates. However, for the Visegrad states (Footnote: The Visegrad states, named after the agreement concluded in the Hungarian town of Visegrad in 1990, are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) of the Central European area, accession to NATO is particularly acute....

[DER SPIEGEL] For you, joining NATO is probably more important than joining the European Union?

[Havel] For reasons of security, being accepted into NATO is indeed more urgent for us than being accepted into the European Union. No one knows what the further developments in Russia will be like and whether we will not experience unpleasant surprises there. Now time is really ripe to seriously negotiate about our membership in NATO; it alone offers a security guarantee. Integration in the European Union remains a long-term process.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you not afraid of a new division of Europe?

[Havel] The danger of a new Yalta (Footnote: At their conference in Yalta in 1945, the Western Allies granted Stalin virtual supremacy over East Europe) would be imminent as soon as the West accepts that certain countries, particularly in Central Europe, belong to Russia's sphere of interest and thus must not join NATO. However, no one has said anything like that so far.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are such fears, which the Baltic States or the Ukrainians might have, not rather irrational nowadays for countries like Poland and the Czech Republic?

[Havel] That is true, but these countries have their historical experiences—particularly Poland, which had problems for centuries with its position in the gravitational field between Russia and Germany.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you have any indications that the spirit of Yalta might gain ground again?

[Havel] I would rather say: Regarding NATO membership, which we desire, I have seen too much restraint and carefulness in the West so far. I would not dare to interpret this hesitation as an indication of a new Yalta, but I would rather rather say it is proof of accustomed stereotypes in thinking and a lack of courage for new solutions.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the conflict about Chechnya a signal for Russia's relapse into imperial ambitions?

[Havel] I would not say that. Imperial policy is the policy of states that try to subjugate other countries. Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. This conflict rather shows a lack of political and democratic culture. This is as if Canada were to attack Quebec—simply inconceivable.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do the events in Chechnya have any influence on the Czechs' feeling of security?

[Havel] We Czechs all still remember Soviet occupation. In our country, we have not had too many illusions about the development of democracy in Russia. Every one of us wants Russia to become a democratic country soon. However, here, probably more than in the West, we realize that this will be a very long and complicated process.

[DER SPIEGEL] Not only the former Soviet Union, but also other regions in Europe are threatened with a relapse into ethnic and religious conflicts after the end of the East-West conflict.

[Havel] Obviously, there is only one means against that: Enforcing the idea of an open bourgeois society and opposing the model of an ethnic state with all its disastrous consequences more energetically than so far. The international community must intervene immediately if

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nationalist concepts of a state give rise to a conflict. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, this was neglected.

[DER SPIEGEL] Two years ago in DER SPIEGEL, you warned that the West had not understood the scope of the upheaval in the East. Could a continuing lack of interest undermine the stability of the postcommunist states?

[Havel] Even though the West gleefully anticipated the collapse of communism for decades, it was not well-enough equipped for this. It is also our task to point out our experiences again and again, but more understanding for our specific problems would be a good thing.

[DER SPIEGEL] This is probably a reference to the fact that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, West Europe erected new economic barriers against the East?

[Havel] One need not speak of an economic Iron Curtain, but of course the various protectionist measures bother us. We are a bit annoyed by the fact that we former dissidents are now more liberal in our trade policy views than our former liberal teachers in the West. They are now afraid of the export of our cheaper products.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the West, the view dominates that a social market economy is the precondition for a human, democratic society. Is this also your view?

[Havel] I do not believe that taking over market economy principles automatically leads to a bourgeois society and humaneness. Of course, it can help, but it is not sufficient on its own.

[DER SPIEGEL] Some people in the West are heading for a two-speed Europe, for concentrating on a core Europe. This will hardly correspond to your view of Europe.

[Havel] It depends on what the two speeds are supposed to mean. I cannot see anything bad in some states wanting to adjust to the Maastricht agreement's integration principles earlier than others. However, if the point were the establishment of a club of the rich and the powerful, which isolates itself from the not so rich and the not so powerful, this would be bad for Europe. By the way, we already have two speeds in Europe. Because of communism, we are damn late and have to work with far greater speed than the Western countries to become full EU members soon. For this, we need the fourth gear, while for you the second gear is sufficient.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will the Czech Republic feel fit for the European Union?

[Havel] I am confident that by the end of this millennium we will be able to become a legitimate member of the European Union—if the European Union wants us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Some of Bonn's partners fear that the reunited Germany might gain too much influence in Central Europe. Are you also worried about that?

[Havel] Germany is our big neighbor, a powerful neighbor, who knows our situation. I think it is quite natural that the Germans can be represented more intensively in the economic field, for instance, than others. However, if we were to be confronted with a policy that is purposefully aiming for supremacy, this would be a reason for resistance. We do not want to be dominated by anyone but want to be an equal member in the family of European democrats.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Havel, this almost brings us back to the Battle at White Mountain. (Footnote: The defeat of the Bohemian and Protestant guilds in the Battle at White Mountain in 1620 initiated the 300-year rule of the Catholic Hapsburgs). We were told about that by Czech guests in your favorite restaurant, "The Golden Tiger," to which you recently even dragged President Clinton.

[Havel] After all of the historical experiences we have had, there are certain fears of the Germans in some parts of Czech society....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...but at White Mountain the Czechs were confronted with the Hapsburgs.

[Havel] They also spoke German. No, seriously: These are prejudices, which we oppose and which we must get rid of. This is also due to the fact that, for a long time, we were not an open society with normal contacts. Here there was no freedom for public reflection about certain problems. The thinking of many Czechs is somehow frozen.

[DER SPIEGEL] Possibly it is an additional element of irritation that the Czech Republic has become smaller because Slovakia split off, while reunited Germany has become even bigger.

[Havel] This is something one can read in the writings of political scientists and commentators. I do not have the impression that Czech society sees this as a problem.

[DER SPIEGEL] Five years ago, you appealed to the Czechs and the Germans to reconcile and to admit mutual guilt. Is our impression incorrect that your initiative has petered out and that a number of questions, such as the problem of the Sudeten Germans as well as compensation for Nazi victims, are blocking reconciliation?

[Havel] I do not think so. On the contrary, I think that the time is now coming when it is necessary to do more for our reconciliation and for deepening our relations. I myself will hold a speech at Charles University on this issue this week. In the future, there must be more intensive contacts between our two peoples, also in the political field. I am simply sure that those who want to hold a real dialogue on the basis of common universal values will always find a partner on the other side.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, thank you for this interview.

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Klaus on Human Rights Report, BIS, NATO

AU1402182295 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 10 Feb 95 p 3

["Regular" interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Chalupa; place and date not given: "We Cannot Speak of a Return Even in Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Chalupa] How do you feel about the U.S. Department of State report, according to which some human rights are being violated in the Czech Republic? One example is the alleged discrimination against Romanies.

[Klaus] There is no need to issue some macho report; the government simply does not share this opinion. It even entrusted Foreign Minister Zieleniec, Interior Minister Jan Ruml, and Deputy Minister for Legislation Jan Kalvoda to issue a straightforward and clear statement on these issues. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] Mr. Prime Minister, did the government request last fall that Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda and Interior Minister Jan Ruml prepare a report on whether the secret services in the Czech Republic are sufficiently controlled? We have information that such a report was prepared and that it stated that the control is sufficient.

[Klaus] The Chamber of Deputies asked us to draft a bill on the reinforcement of the control of the information services. The government decided that the bill is to be prepared jointly by Interior Minister Jan Ruml and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda. At the turn of the year, these two government officials sent me a letter in which they reported that having studied the situation, they arrived at the conclusion that no legal reform is needed. These departments subsequently prepared a draft of a letter that I signed and passed unchanged to the parliament chairman. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] Do you, as the chairman of the strongest right-wing party in the country, have the feeling of a certain threat to the ideas of conservatism and liberalism in the region of Visegrad countries, when you observe how in all of the other countries the right-wing parties are in the opposition?

[Klaus] I do not feel anything like that. I believe that the election results precisely reflect political views of the citizens of these countries, and, contrary to many people, I have never shared the illusions that anticommunism equals liberalism or conservatism. So I believe that neither in Poland nor in Hungary or Slovakia can we speak about a return. After all, precisely maintaining the position in which these countries stood regarding their views is their right and their proper stand.

[Chalupa] The U.S. Republicans expressed their wish that the U.S. Government implement a legal measure on the admission to NATO of the Czech Republic and other countries in its region, and that by 10 January 1999. How do you feel about these endeavors? Do you believe it is possible to estimate when the Czech Republic will join NATO?

[Klaus] Look, I do not believe it is a matter of dates. Not on the order of years, and even less on the order of months or weeks. So, the date of 10 January leaves me absolutely cold because not the quantitative decision on the matter but rather the quality of the decision is of importance. The Western countries simply must make a decision. Either they want to admit countries like the Czech Republic to NATO or they do not.

Klaus, Tunisian Foreign Minister Discuss Relations

LD1402220495 Tunis Tunisian Republic Radio Network in Arabic 2100 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Within the framework of a working visit to the Czech Republic, Mr. Habib Ben Yahya, [Tunisian] foreign affairs minister, met Czech Prime Minster Mr. Vaclav Klaus yesterday afternoon.

The meeting dealt with bilateral relations and issues of common interest, in addition to the role assigned to the two countries in promoting their environment at the regional and international levels. [passage omitted]

Klaus stressed the Czech Government's determination to strengthen the existing friendship and cooperation relations between the two countries in all spheres.

On the other hand, the Czech prime minister suggested the establishment of a free trade zone between the two countries, provided that a memorandum affirming the two countries' will to set up this zone be signed in the future.

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Arrives for Visit

LD1402211795 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1815 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague, 14 Feb—Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, arrived here today on an official visit to the Czech Republic that will last for several days, and this is within his present European tour. [passage omitted]

During his visit to Prague, Shaykh al-Sabah will meet Czech President Havel and will discuss the consolidation and strengthening of bilateral relations and issues of mutual interest. [passage omitted]

Talks With Foreign Minister

LD1502121995 Kuwait Radio Kuwait in Arabic 1000 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, is due to

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meet Czech President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today within the framework of his current official visit to Prague.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad met yesterday evening with Czech Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec. They discussed a number of issues of mutual concern, foremost among which was the latest political developments in the Arab Gulf in the light of the Iraqi regime's procrastination regarding implementation of UN resolutions pertaining to the war to liberate Kuwait.

At the end of the meeting, the two sides stressed that their views were identical on the issues discussed. [passage omitted]

Commentary Examines Relations Within Coalition

AU1502095695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 Feb 95 p 12

[Commentary by Petr Novacek: "Better a Handshake With Klaus Than Suicide With Zeman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many things imply that the most serious coalition conflict to date, triggered by the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and its conjectures about illegal activities by the Security and Intelligence Service [BIS], will just dwindle away. Although, in the end, the parliamentary commission confirmed last year's legal vacuum concerning the counterintelligence service's foreign contacts and induced the government to supervise BIS and set its tasks more systematically, following the humbug provoked by Kalvoda's party, that would be an outcome out of all proportion.

Nevertheless, the dispute surrounding BIS was, sui generis, useful. It was a test that forced the governing parties to display their qualities.

Kalvoda's Alliance failed utterly. Its unfounded accusations against BIS confirm retrospectively the original impression that ODA provoked the affair in order to divert attention from its questionable financial operations with Moravec [owner of the Credit and Industrial Bank]. In any event, by its improper and uncongenial course of action, it has further worsened communication within the coalition, which it, otherwise, often criticizes; has caused a stir among the public for nothing; and has damaged the state's reputation. From now on, ODA will no longer be able to pass itself off as a decent conservative party that, within the coalition, improves the morals of the somewhat plebeian Civic Democratic Party [ODS] or as a reliable, calculable political partner.

The People's Party did not fare too well either. First, it associated itself with Kalvoda's reservations against BIS, then it applied the brakes in the middle of the affair, and, finally, in the government vote, it dumped the ODA chairman overboard completely. Obviously, at a certain point, it "took" the ODS's hints that it is prepared to discuss church restitution again. Or, it has simply returned to the traditions of its party, which, under Sramek and Hala between the wars, was known for its masterly twists on the political ice and its inclination toward behind-the-scenes deals. One way or another, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] has demonstrated that it can be a surprising, incalculable, and unreliable party.

On the other hand, the Christian Democratic Party [KDS] has confirmed its trustworthiness because, from the beginning, it rejected categorically the vague arguments of an improper course of action pursued by ODA and the KDU-CSL. That will probably be the end of the incipient alliance of the three smaller coalition parties against the dominant ODS. Moreover, it seems that Ivan Pilip, exasperated by Lux's whims and under pressure from the approaching elections, is steering the KDS into Klaus's shipyard. The chances of Kalvoda and Lux's resistance to the ODS being effective—of course, justified by the inclination of Klaus's party to negotiate within the coalition from a position of strength—will thus decline significantly for the remainder of this coalition's term in office.

In view of the situation into which they have maneuvered themselves, the outpouring of speculation about whether ODA and the KDU-CSL are looking for allies who would help to extricate them from Klaus's iron embrace is hardly surprising.

The chairmen of the two parties have themselves contributed to the speculation by holding meetings with Milos Zeman and, specifically and first and foremost, by informing the public of them belatedly and vaguely. The well-known fact that Zeman has long and persistently been considering how, after the next elections and in a coalition with ODA and the KDU-CSL, to force the ODS into opposition has fueled the speculation. Moreover, it is being whispered in the political lobbies that an accommodating attitude toward certain ODS figures, mistakingly regarded as an anti-Klaus Trojan horse, has been conveyed via intermediaries from Lidovy Dum [headquarters of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)] and also, apparently, from ODA and the KDU-CSL. It goes without saying that it would be the equivalent of an attempt at political hara-kiri if the leaders of ODA and the KDU-CSL were not to reject vehemently the rumors about their carrying on with the left-wing Zeman and if they were not to say whether they have agreed on a coordinated course of action based on Zeman's frivolous prognoses.

For some reason, the CSSD chairman thinks that, in the next elections, the ODS will decline to about 23 percent of the vote and that the social democrats (perhaps in a coalition with the Greens) will get more. Similarly improbable is another Zeman calculation—namely, that ODA and the KDU-CSL could win enough votes so that, along with the CSSD, they add up to a coalition majority. Kalvoda and Lux would have to be fools to

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wager on this bizarre lottery or, for example, if they were to begin to block social reform now to spite the ODS and curry favor with the CSSD.

A variant whereby ODA and the KDU-CSL try to wipe out their counterintelligence shame and the ODS assists them in doing so to make sure that the fulfillment of the government's program does not end in a major deficit seems less risky and, therefore, more likely. In this case, it is possible to anticipate an electoral victory by the current coalition next year. If, at the same time, the ODS were to win enough votes to enable it to form a parliamentary majority with only one partner, the fun and games with BIS could have fatal consequences for either Lux or Kalvoda.

Arms Maker To Stop Exporting Military Ammunition

AU0702151395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by "km": "Sellier & Bellot To Stop Exporting Military Ammunition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—One of the most important Czech arms factories of the pre-November [1989] era, Sellier & Bellot, which successfully supplied many Warsaw Pact countries with ammunition, will no longer export military ammunition.

Alexandr Petrzelka, spokesman of the Vlasim firm, confirmed yesterday that the company has not applied to the Industry and Trade Ministry for a license to trade in military material.

Sellier & Bellot will manufacture only the minimum amount of cartridges for submachine gun and automatic rifles for the domestic market. The once famous arms manufacturer intends to focus on the production of ammunition for sporting and hunting arms.

Petrzelka said that Sellier & Bellot is giving up foreign trade because it is an unstable market without any prospects for the company. "Military production is no longer a priority for us," Petrzelka said.

It is generally believed, however, that the decision can be linked to the recent stance by the Industry and Trade Ministry, according to which a Sellier & Bellot subsidiary, the firm SB Export Ltd. Vlasim, was denied a license to trade in military material. The negative stand of the Ministry was allegedly based on the fact that certain executive officers of the company do not satisfy the conditions of the screening law, which is a necessary condition for the company to carry out foreign trade in arms. The ministry only commented on this as a certain endeavor to obtain the license by evading the law.

Although the Vlasim firm has been gradually reducing its military program, it will not leave the RDP Group arms manufacturer consortium, of which it was a founding member.

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Meciar, Chernomyrdin Hold News Conference

LD1402164595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian-Slovak relations are free of contentious issues, while mutual cooperation is assuming a new and qualitatively higher level, the Russian and Slovak prime ministers unanimously noted at the end of Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Slovakia today.

At a news conference attended by more than 120 Slovak and foreign journalists, Vladimir Meciar emphasized that the two governments have created the appropriate legislative basis for cooperation of a new type; this should facilitate not only contacts at the intergovernmental and ministerial level but also direct contacts between enterprises.

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin called for the renewing of the former economic ties and their expansion. He described relations between the two countries as friendly and based on the principles of partnership and on shared interests. He added that this constitutes an important aspect in strengthening the stability of Central and East Europe.

Chernomyrdin on NATO Extension

LD1402200795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1800 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A number of questions addressed to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin at this afternoon's news conference had one thing in common—they all touched on Moscow's stance regarding the process of extending NATO.

[begin Chernomyrdin recording, in Russian with Slovak translation superimposed] As regards our attitude to Slovakia and all those who endeavor to join NATO, I would like to emphasize that we cannot forbid anything to anybody. That is not our role. But we cannot understand those who wish to accelerate this process. So far no one has managed to explain this to us. Why is it necessary to join NATO in such haste? What is behind it? Does somebody really want to see confrontation again? Would that suit anybody? We Russians do not want it.

Nowadays NATO has mechanisms for activity and cooperation—above all, the Partnership for Peace program. Why not start cooperation within this framework? And one day we will all cooperate with NATO. [end recording]

[Announcer] [passage omitted] The nuclear power station at Mochovce was another point of interest, particularly among foreign journalists. Speaking about Slovak-Russian cooperation in this sphere, Prime Minister Meciar also spoke about relations with Austria.

[begin Meciar recording] One of the agreements deals with cooperation at the Mochovce nuclear power station. Without technological assistance from Russia, we could not complete this power station. The Russian side has demonstrated its intention to help us, and this is important for the ability to complete the Mochovce nuclear power station at all.

We find it hard to accept that a power station of the same type is under construction at Temelin and there is not a squeak, but, when the same type of nuclear power station is being built at Mochovce, everybody screams. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] is considering the conditions attached to its loan, and many controversial views are being exchanged. But even if efforts to abort the EBRD loan are successful, even without the EBRD's assistance, we should be able to complete the first unit of the nuclear power station.

We value our friendship with Austria, but, at the same time, we have to say: Why is it that Austria or the Austrian media do not stir the same hysteria around Temelin as they do around Mochovce? Does Austria really want to lose Slovakia as a political friend? [end recording] [pas[illegible]omitted]

Russian Ambassador Discusses Debt Repayment Issue

AU1502092595 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by "(bap)": "Yastrzhembskiy: In the Debt Issue, the Ball Is Now in the Slovak Court"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—If Slovakia is interested in purchasing military hardware from Russia, Moscow will be interested in selling it. This was how Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Russian ambassador to the Slovak Republic, replied to a question from NARODNA OBRODA yesterday on whether the inclusion of a senior government official from the Russian military-industrial complex in Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's delegation means that Moscow is still interested in repaying part of its debt to Slovakia in this form.

In this context, he commented that the Slovak Government has still not decided which bank will be entrusted with calculating the Russian debt, so the $176 million that represents the value of the aircraft whose delivery the two sides agreed upon almost 18 months ago has not yet been "written off" from this parcel. As far as the issues associated with repaying the debt are concerned, "the ball is now in the Slovak court," declared Yastrzhembskiy. [passage omitted]

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Army Telecommunications Center Update Desired

LD1402221595 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] An additional 12-15 billion forints is necessary to modernize the Hungarian Army's main telecommunications center, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti told guests arriving at the center to celebrate its 50th anniversary. The minister added that the development of the army headquarters telecommunications center is necessary, if for no other reason than our intention to join NATO.

[Unidentified correspondent] So far, very few of the Army staff, probably only the older ones, have seen the telephone, cryptography and cipher equipment in the main telecommunications center. For example, certain equipment of the teleprinter system has been in operation since 1949. The president of the Republic is of the view that employees in the main telecommunications center deserve awards because they make up for technical shortcomings with enthusiasm. [passage omitted]

Time has left a visible mark on the 4,000-line telephone exchange and on the teleprinter network. A power generator that provides continuous electricity supply for the center is relatively new, and there are quite modern computers and satellite equipment, as well. However, according to Defense Minister Keleti, there is a need for investments to the tune of billions of forints, particularly because a modern telecommunications network is a basic condition for our admission to NATO.

[Begin Keleti recording] At least 12-15 billion forints is necessary to launch a development project. This would not have to be paid at once, but over a longer period, over a few years. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The defense minister is of the view that a large-scale development project could be started within 2-3 years.

Ministry Official Reviews Immigration Controls

LD1402220295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Let us see what it is like to be a foreigner and a police officer in search of aliens in Hungary. How does the law on alien surveillance, which came into force six months ago, work, and how should it be changed? Our guest in the studio is Sandor Nyiri, deputy state secretary at the Interior Ministry. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Nyiri] In Hungary, approximately 5,000-6,000 foreign nationals commit crimes annually. This includes drunk driving, theft, car theft, murder. If I consider that 42 million foreigners come to Hungary annually, then we can put this into perspective. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Will we ever need policemen who might be Ukrainians, Chechens, Chinese?

[Nyiri] We will definitely need police who know foreign languages—Ukrainian, Russian, Chinese, for example. Measures have already been taken in this regard, to start teaching young policemen these languages. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] What are the figures for our country, roughly? How many foreigners are staying here legally, illegally, permanently or temporarily?

[Nyiri] I can not give you the figure for illegal aliens. This is estimated data, let us not mislead anyone. Up to the end of 1994 there were about 73,000 immigrants [bevandorlo] in Hungary.

[Announcer] Have these people settled here permanently?

[Nyiri] These are people who are staying here legally. That is to say: in accordance with the regulations.

[Announcer] But temporarily or for a longer term? Have they settled here?

[Nyiri] An immigrant is one who has settled, yes. Those with permission to stay for longer than one year total around 32,000. I have already talked about the crimes. Last year the number of foreigners ordered to leave was 15,596. Half of these were ordered out by the Police; the other half by the Border Guard. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Now, my question is this: Do we want there to be a limit? Is there a certain number up to which we allow people to come in, but not beyond that? Or are we saying that everybody can come who satisfies certain conditions?

[Nyiri] Everybody can come as a tourist. But we do have to pay attention to the immigration limit.

[Announcer] Is there such a limit?

[Nyiri] There is, there is, there is.

[Announcer] Who sets this limit?

[Nyiri] Generally it, what this figure is, is decided every year by the government, and this is the way in every other European country as well.

[Announcer] How does this filter down to those who implement the law? How does policeman X, who has the file in front of him, know whether this applicant still fits into the quota or whether he would be one above the permitted figure?

[Nyiri] This does not have to be treated like a mathematical task, because Hungary's situation is a special one. After all, in the surrounding countries there live large numbers of foreign citizens who to us, on account of their origin, are not foreigners, since they are Hungarian people. Now, this cannot be treated as a mathematical affair.

[Announcer] So, they have priority?

[Nyiri] Yes, yes. Family unification is a consideration, and helps in acceptance. But in this issue, it cannot be ignored that the reason behind this large migration of people that has now developed is the economy in the other country. The majority of people set out in the hope of a better livelihood,

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and humanly this can be appreciated and understood. Now, on the other hand, the host countries' approach is that their own citizens' economic situation ought to be somehow made better—such as in Hungary—for the sake of example. And these are the things that the government has to amalgamate, with very good methods.

[Announcer] But are the methods they are using good? There are entrepreneurs, or college teachers or students, who come here and who first and foremost bring money in, not take it out. And they are treated in exactly the same way as those who might be considered just these kinds of economic refugees. And there has been a lot of criticism levelled at the police, at those who implement the law, in that the manner in which these people are received, the way their applications are considered, the questionnaires, the health checks—these are not all that favorable and pleasant, and they rather put off these people, who according to indications we are pleased to see.

[Nyiri] Well, our conversation deals with this a little, because in the Interior Ministry, with the involvement of the organs that belong to us, the reexamination of the rules of law is under way. [passage omitted]

Now, the leadership of the National Police Headquarters has designated 1995—in police work—as the year of surveillance of aliens, and emphasis is placed on this by the leadership, the leadership of the ministry and the leadership of the police. [passage omitted] [end recording]

SZDSZ Official Views Coalition Relations

AU1402211295 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Feb 95 p 8

[Interview with SZDSZ Executive Chairman Balint Magyar by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Operation Cannot Be Stopped"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] What changes have the events of the past days brought about in the relations of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]?

[Magyar] Laszlo Bekesi's resignation created a critical situation in the coalition because his name indicated the necessary economic policy direction that was laid down in the government program. With the resignation of the finance minister, there was a danger that the economic policy might take a different direction. However, a new chance has arisen with the nomination of a chairman for the central bank and a new finance minister. The two nominees are strongly committed to the government's economic program; therefore, they fully meet the SZDSZ's prior requirements. [passage omitted]

During an economic operation, the finance minister cannot give enough anesthesia to the patient who, in turn, clearly indicates that the treatment is hurting. However, it has become vitally important to complete the operation. To replace the doctor, stop the operation, and caress the patient instead is not a solution. This might make the patient feel good temporarily, but it will not cure him. A lasting favorable change can only be expected in the SZDSZ's and the MSZP's relations when everyone in the coalition declares that the [economic] operation cannot be stopped, financial equilibrium has to be restored by reducing state expenditures, and we have to immediately start the reform of state administration. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Has the SZDSZ not been convinced by Gyula Horn's steps and statements in the recent days?

[Magyar] We have a mixed situation. It is not easy to assess the significance of words. Horn has certainly declared his support for the Bekesi program, but he has also referred a number of times to the need for corrections. It is not clear how deep he wants these changes to go. Naturally, a program can—and, on the basis of governmental experience gained in a few months, must—be examined by experts. However, rather than on the basis of a "future image" that also contains elements of wishful thinking and folk tales, it must be done on the basis of very concrete proposals. In my opinion, the debates actually hide a serious political struggle in an expert disguise. The economic ideas of certain political forces can easily lead to insolvency but these forces only care about their momentary popularity. Implicitly, they actually hope some of Hungary's debts would be canceled, or at least rescheduled, if the country were to become insolvent. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Horn indicated that he would like the SZDSZ to take a more definite responsibility vis-a-vis the public for the government's measures. How well-founded do you believe this demand to be?

[Magyar] The SZDSZ and the MSZP allied themselves for joint governing and joint responsibility. These kinds of statements are flawed on two points. On the one hand, when someone likes to make decisions on his own, he cannot expect others, who did not participate in these decisions and might not even agree with them, to share the responsibility for his ideas and suggestions. On the other hand, it is unfortunate to complain about the lack of responsibility taken by the Free Democrats when they have represented unpopular views before the public, sometimes even in opposition to the prime minister—for example, the case of the 13th month's wage or certain sections of the supplementary budget. We feel that, in these cases, too, we stood by the more economically reasonable solutions and were not guided by other considerations. When the prime minister assessed the government's work at the beginning of this parliamentary period, on the positive side, he mentioned only those issues that might momentarily be popular but that do not have much to do with the long-term solution of the problems. We "saved" some hopeless centers of heavy industry for a few years for many millions of forints, as has been the custom for 20 years. He did not stand by the unpopular issues, and even a linguistic analysis would not have found any terms in his speech that expressed the government's unity. Much to the contrary: It contained allusions to the prime minister's being an integrating politician who strives for good solutions and who "breathes

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together" with the people, and statements on his ministers claiming that they cannot solve their tasks because public law and order is not maintained, a realistic picture is not given about the situation, and they are inclined toward cultural struggle. Interestingly, at the same time, the trade unions operating in the areas led by Free Democrat ministers have been the most active in recent months. Think about the railway workers, the teachers, and the firemen. In the interest of the government program, the Free Democrat ministers resisted the unachievable demands of the trade unions. The reason is that a "strike spiral" that would follow successful strikes would definitely lead to a wage spiral and, ultimately, to increasing inflation, budget deficit, and the increase of the differences between those social groups that can organize themselves and those that cannot. At the same time, strangely enough, the trade unions are very calm in a number of spheres where the situation is at least as bad—for example in the area of health. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What are your views on the opinion of economic circles that it would be good for the MSZP and the SZDSZ to deal with certain important issues that have not yet been discussed and that have not been laden with the burden of disputes?

[Magyar] This suggestion is worth considering, and the government program itself also forces us to prepare new decisions. The process of preparing legislation is getting rather slow, and economic legislation is actually stagnant. At the moment, it is difficult to see whether certain draft bills do not come before Parliament because of technical delays or because of the differences of views within the MSZP that are difficult for us to observe. I hope for the former, but assume the latter. [passage omitted]

Some of our conflicts with the prime minister stem from the fact that our philosophies of government are not completely identical in spite of the jointly accepted government program. A government can make little improvement, but it can cause much damage. In our view, the government's task is to establish rational forms of the state's withdrawal from the economy. Since we came to government, we have been continuously seeking ways of reducing the government's influence in certain areas of life. In Hungary, more than 60 percent of the national product is redistributed by the government, while in the West this proportion is much smaller. We also need to cut back some of the government's spheres of authority. Rather than whether we should have a privatization minister or whether the finance minister or someone else should perform the tasks, the basic issue for the SZDSZ is that the government should only be able to supervise, rather than directly control, privatization. Direct control would by all means draw politics into privatization just as it did during the government of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. In addition, we would not even dream of changing the status of the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] but the prime minister has expressed his concern that the MNB might be too independent. This independence can be uncomfortable for a government in many cases but this is indispensable for the country's interest. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What are your views on the news that the SZDSZ has been facing big problems in recent days because it cannot form a united view within its leading bodies on participation in the coalition?

[Magyar] I do not think anyone can see any signs of this. I find this an impossible idea. None of us have so far said that we should leave the coalition. A national council session and a parliamentary group meeting specifically dealing with the coalition's situation were held recently. We do not have important differences of views in our assessments. A four-year joint governing that would last at least until the next elections is in the SZDSZ's interest. I am also speaking as a campaign chief when I say that, while the government is functioning adequately, in connection with the elections it would not even be in our interests to leave the coalition just before the next elections, much less now. However, a well-functioning coalition also means a limitation of the prime minister's sovereignty, and he cannot keep making his own party, its leaders, its parliamentary group, and his coalition partner face ready situations. In many respects, the current practice cannot be continued in the future. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Can you see a danger of the SZDSZ's coming into conflict with its voters?

[Magyar] The answer is determined by two points of view that do not always coincide in everything. Our voters expect us to consistently represent our views aimed at economic progress and political stability. They also want us to remain in the government coalition—but they do not necessarily link these two requirements. They do not always take into consideration for how long it is possible to implement the former within the coalition.

[Pinter] Can you meet the two needs at the same time?

[Magyar] This depends largely on whether a team dealing with economic legislation and daily economic issues will be set up in the government, a team that takes a firm professional stance and that is able to obtain the backing of the entire government, including that of the prime minister.

IMF Expert Calls for Supplementary Budget

LD1402162295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyorgy Kupics, Hungarian representative of the IMF, is concerned about the fact that the net foreign debt has grown by more than $2 billion. In addition to the consistent implementation of the public finances reform, Gyorgy Kupics has also called for the submission of a supplementary budget early this spring. According to Kupics, the current account balance of payments deficit, which amounts to nearly $4 billion, shows the overheated state of the Hungarian economy. He is of the view that a high deficit in the budget and in public finances as well as pay raises that have increased spending power significantly are behind this.

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Walesa Said Still Considering Dissolving Sejm

LD1402141495 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential Spokesman Leszek Spalinski has said that the president has not yet decided whether he will dissolve parliament, but he is still considering such a move. Speaking on Polish Radio, Leszek Spalinski expressed the opinion that the self-dissolution of parliament would be the best solution in the present situation. Leszek Spalinski also let it be known that, in a telephone conversation with Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, Lech Walesa presented the candidacies of Andrzej Olechowski for foreign minister and Zbigniew Wojciech Okonski for defense minister.

[Begin Spalinski recording] We can be certain that the president will not agree to sign a nomination of a person he does not accept. This is his right, and it is difficult to expect him to forsake this, especially because the coalition did not question this right from the outset and stressed its importance. [end recording]

[Announcer] Asked about the president's attitude toward Speaker Oleksy, Leszek Spalinski replied that Oleksy represents a political settlement originating in the 19 September 1993 elections, which was not supported by Lech Walesa.

[Begin Spalinski recording] Irrespective of personal feelings and opinions, there remains the issue of policy, the issue of principles. And because this happened as they happened on 19 September 1993 and parliament was elected with a majority, which has the right to put forward a candidate for prime minister, the president has little say in this. The president always says—and acts accordingly—that he respects the verdict of democracy irrespective of his views and preferences. [end recording]

Oleksey on Possible Ministerial Appointments

LD1502093595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0839 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 15 Feb—Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, the coalition candidate for prime minister, recalled on the radio this morning that, in the case of a constructive vote of no-confidence, it is parliament that chooses the government and the president who presents acts of nomination and accepts oaths of office. He added, however, that he will seek to ensure that the filling of the so-called presidential ministries are carried out upon the basis of accord with President Lech Walesa. Oleksy did not preclude that he may present the Sejm with candidatures that have been given negative opinions by the president.

The speaker said: "This interpretation reduces the whole matter to the creation of a parliamentary government and, thus, a government that the new prime minister presents to parliament and that parliament chooses. The president, on the other hand, appoints the government in the sense that he presents the act of nomination and receives the oath. That is how I understand this, and that is how most constitutional lawyers with whom I have spoken understand it. This thus means that, with respect to the so-called presidential ministries, I am obliged to seek the opinion of the president, and I will with all certainty do this, and surely more than once if the need arises."

Oleksy added that "the opinion of the president may after all be a negative one, and the candidates may be appointed as ministers. Because, in this case, in this variant—and there are four constitutional variants for the creation of a government—a parliamentary government is created and finally chosen by parliament. Of course, I will very much strive and seek to ensure that there is no collision, that there is accord, and that, together with the president, we do not lead each other around the interpretations of who is right and which lawyers are constitutionally in the right because this is not the point. It may be the case that the candidatures presented by me to the Sejm will be different from those the president may want because they can be presented to parliament despite the negative opinion of the president," Oleksy stressed.

Daily Reports on Coalition Talks, Problems

WS1402134595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by E.Cz., J.B.L., and R.B.: "Coalition Agreed; New Government, Old Program"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During yesterday's talks leaders of the coalition agreed on the main programmatic goals of the government that is to be formed by Jozef Oleksy. Most probably today representatives of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will arrive at the final text of the new coalition accord.

Goals of the Coalition

Representatives of PSL and SLD, including Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Jozef Oleksy, whom the coalition has entrusted with the mission of forming the new government, agreed on the main programmatic goals of the new government yesterday. These goals are as follows: "continuation of economic growth through measures based on the 'Strategy for Poland'; further reforms of the public administration and strengthening of the territorial self-government; social policy reforms, improving the security of citizens, changes in the legal system; active efforts aimed at Poland's integration with the European structures." All this was included in the joint communique. Both partners accepted principles of internal cooperation within the coalition and agreed that the government's press spokesperson should be appointed.

"He Did Not Spoil Anything Evidently"

"We believe that we will be able to finalize decisions concerning programmatic issues on 14 February," said

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Jerzy Szmajdzinski [secretary general of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] after the meeting. The final version of the new coalition accord will probably be agreed upon today. Only then will the coalition's leaders begin talks on candidates for ministerial posts. "All the work should be completed within the next few days," says Szmajdzinski.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy told reporters before the meeting with representatives of SLD and PSL that he had not yet taken the decision whether or not he would be prime minister. In Szmajdzinski's opinion, the decision is to be made only after both parties reach agreements regarding the program and the structure of the new cabinet. The condition that Oleksy has submitted is also the budget law, which he says must first come into force.

"Different approaches to the new government became visible already today," Jozef Oleksy said yesterday. "Some people would like to look upon it as a revolutionary turning point, as something that is very promising; however, they forget that the Pawlak government did continue reforms in Poland, and it did not spoil anything evidently. Regardless of the delays and the slowing down of some processes, one cannot expect a radical change, because the program of the coalition has been defined as a program which is needed by Poland and which is correct from the point of view of the transformations."

Reform of the Center: How and When?

SLD proposed to PSL that in the formation of the new government, the reform of the center be taken into account, that is, ministries of the treasury and economy be established and several economic ministries be, at the same time, liquidated. Jozef Oleksy went even as far as to say that if his government were formed, it would certainly have a ministry of the treasury. PSL believes that such a change is not possible, that it calls for the passing of appropriate laws by the Sejm. SLD claims that this can be reconciled by, for example, appointing directors of the ministers that are to be liquidated or by assigning directors of the new, still nonexistent ministries until these are actually set up. PSL is to reply today whether or not it agrees to the concept of reforming the center as presented by SLD.

Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko yesterday presented the leaders of SLD and PSL with a several-dozen-page presentation of his concept of reforming the center, which differs from SLD's view of it. We found out that Kolodko proposes, among other things, liquidation of the economic ministries that have existed so far and establishment of four other ministries: of public finance, economy, economic infrastructure (transport, communications), and of the treasury (along with privatization).

Opinions were heard in SLD that the candidacy of Professor Dariusz Rosati for finance minister should be reconsidered. Many politicians believe that the cooperation with the incumbent deputy prime minister for economic affairs is rather difficult, and his concept of reforming the center differs from the one that is advocated in SLD.

Professor Dariusz Rosati did not deny that such opinions had reached him as well. He told us, however, that he was not interested in becoming one of the government's ministers right now. He also believes that Grzegorz Kolodko should have the opportunity to continue the work which he has initiated.

Aides to Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko are saying that he is ready to enter the government if the following conditions are met: the "Strategy for Poland" continues to be the government's program; if the reform of the center and the reform of the pension system, proposed by him, are implemented; and if the economy remains open to the world and the person in charge of the government's economic affairs has an opportunity to act efficiently.

What the PSL Is Interested In

PSL Club Deputy Chairman Janusz Dobrosz said at a news conference in Wroclaw that as far as the formation of the new government is concerned, the most important issues for PSL are as follows: the government's program, agreements concerning its structure, and only then the filling of ministerial posts. Dobrosz admitted that PSL is interested, among other things, in appointing ministers in the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Justice Ministry.

PSL's Aleksander Bentkowski, in turn, says that the only people in the Pawlak cabinet who stand a chance of staying in Oleksy's government are Aleksander Luczak and Stanislaw Zelichowski. The peasants are mentioning Bentkowski as a potential successor to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz.

Politicians of the coalition are today also to think about the date of submitting the motion requesting that a constructive no- confidence vote be held. SLD's Sejm Deputy Jerzy Jaskiernia said that such a motion can be submitted no sooner than in two weeks' time, at the 1-3-March sitting of the Sejm, once Jozef Oleksy has formed his government and once it has been approved by the president.

Oleksy: No Basic Changes to Coalition Agreement

LD1502105495 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The program for a new cabinet has been agreed upon, together with the principles for the cooperation of the coalition partners. An agreement on this matter is to be signed today. [passage omitted]

Jozef Oleksy has told Polish radio that the agreement does not envisage a fundamental turnaround in policy hitherto.

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[Begin Oleksy recording] I wish to firmly state, please do not expect that the coalition agreement is an entirely new agreement, that this is a turnaround that is departing from this course that has been implemented for the 15 months. This agreement is to remove these (?misformulations) that were the cause of friction within the coalition and of its ineffectiveness, and later the cause of criticism for the inefficiency of the government's functioning. [end recording] [passage omitted]

No Yielding by PSL, SLD to Walesa on Cabinet

WS1502121795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 15 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by "an," "dom," and "knysz": "Ministries of Political Discontent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Jozef Oleksy did not reach an agreement with the president on the issue of the so-called presidential ministries. He does, however, confirm his "readiness to form the government." The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is lending him support with claims that Walesa is not needed in the process of forming the cabinet. The president himself believes otherwise.*

Coalition talks held at the Office of the Council of Ministers yesterday lasted several hours. A communique was issued: "Speaker Jozef Oleksy confirms he is ready to form a government."

"We will decide on who enters the government between ourselves. We have already suggested our candidates for ministers. Now the speaker will talk to them," SLD's Jerzy Szmajdzinski told journalists. He added there would be "no major changes or reshuffles in terms of division of spheres of influence" between the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the SLD. Several ministers will remain intact.

It has already been agreed that there will be only one deputy prime minister (currently there are three) and that he will be from the PSL.

What Does the Small Constitution Say?

In a telephone conversation held yesterday morning, the president presented Speaker Oleksy with his three candidates for ministers: for the Ministry of National Defense [MON] Zbigniew Okonski; for the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] Andrzej Milczanowski; for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] Andrzej Ananicz, from the President's Chancellery and formerly deputy minister at the MSZ.

The president is convinced that the small constitution gives him the right to indicate who is to head those ministries. Oleksy did not approve of the list and the interpretation of the small constitution. The small constitution provides that the president's opinion should be solicited when appointing those three ministers, yet, according to Marek Borowski [SLD], that opinion is not binding for the new prime minister.

"The Sejm will thus form a new government with the MON, MSZ, and MSW heads that Prime Minister Oleksy chooses, and the president has no grounds for questioning his decision. If they are approved by the Sejm, Walesa will have to accept them," says SLD Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatowski.

The presidents's legal adviser, Lech Falandysz, interprets the small constitution differently, claiming that the president may refuse to endorse the government even if the cabinet is approved by a confidence vote in parliament.

The Demanding President

"You complained that I do not know how to solve conflicts with the president. Now the speaker has seen for himself that talking with the president is not that easy," Pawlak is alleged to have said at the coalition meeting that began at noon yesterday.

The speaker would rather talk to the president on the so-called presidential ministries and the budget bill that the president still has not signed. Coalition members admit that agreement with the president is impossible at this point.

That is probably why Oleksy delayed the declaration on his willingness to undertake the mission of forming the government. Prime Minister Pawlak later told his deputies: "They say I am incapable of making quick decisions, but the speaker is not so good at it either."

Moreover, Oleksy first wants a new government to be formed, and only then will the new prime minister resign as Sejm speaker, we learned unofficially.

"Perhaps the speaker wants to be both prime minister and president because, if Lech Walesa is put before the State Tribunal, the speaker of the Sejm takes over as head of state," Prime Minister Pawlak quipped at the party club meeting yesterday.

Behind the scenes, PSL members said Oleksy was afraid of undertaking the mission of forming the government, and SLD politicians explained: "Oleksy is cautious, but there is strong determination on both sides—in the PSL and in the SLD—to form this new government."

To Whom Will the Economy Go?

The PSL and the SLD are completing a new, 11-page coalition agreement. The coalition, under pressure from the PSL, decided to establish a new economic administration center. The PSL finally complied in exchange for concessions on agricultural issues—for instance, a provision in a law on family-run farms. The new agree nent does not clearly specify that Poland is to be divided into powiats. It only states that the issue should be considered.

The coalition is to present the Sejm with a draft law on the economic administration center by the end of April.

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Marek Borowski [SLD] told journalists that the coalition members differ in opinion as to how the reform is to be carried out. They cannot decide whether to abstain from appointing heads of ministries that are to be dissolved and quickly execute the projected reform, or appoint those ministers and develop a minute reorganization timetable. We learned unofficially that the plenipotentiary for the economic center is to be Grzegorz Kolodko. Dariusz Rosati was considered for this post, but the coalition concluded he would reject the offer. Marek Borowski was unacceptable to the PSL.

Mazowiecki on Political Crisis, NATO Membership

BR1502121695 Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Feb 95 p 14

[Interview with Poland's Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former prime minister and current Union of Freedom (UW) leader, by Elisabeth Kulakowska in Warsaw; date not given: "Lech Walesa Represented a Threat to Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kulakowska] Is democracy threatened in Poland?

[Mazowiecki] Poland is a democratic country that defends its democracy. I do not think one should fear an authoritarian drift. The current crisis is certainly serious, but there is no reason to believe that Poland will not emerge from it in the coming weeks. In a democratic system, there is always a solution: Trust the voters. That is what we will do if Jozef Oleksy—LIBERATION editor's note: the candidate proposed by the coalition of the Left to succeed Waldemar Pawlak—president of the chamber of deputies, does not succeed in forming his government.

[Kulakowska] Will the dissolution of parliament be the only solution if Oleksy fails?

[Mazowiecki] No. The Union of Freedom proposes the formation of a government of experts. It will enjoy the confidence of the parliament but will be made up of people belonging both to parties represented in the chamber of deputies and to parties outside the parliament. In a recent survey, this idea received the approval of 42 percent of the population. The SLD (Alliance of the Democratic Left, former communist) and the Polish Peasant Party (of outgoing Prime Minister Pawlak), the two organizations in the coalition in power, will support this solution only if there is no other way out of the crisis.

[Kulakowska] In your opinion, what are the causes of the current crisis?

[Mazowiecki] President Lech Walesa, to the same degree as the coalition, is responsible for the instability currently reigning in Poland. The head of state wants a change of government, but he is acting solely as a candidate for his own reelection (in the presidential vote scheduled for the end of 1995). The coalition, for its part, through its action—or inaction—within the government, has led to a situation of paralysis of power and a slowdown of the economic reforms.

[Kulakowska] Is Walesa a threat to democracy in Poland?

[Mazowiecki] For a while Walesa represented a threat, but he backed off, and up to now he has not violated the Constitution. We will never know whether he actually intended to violate it (allusion to the threat of the head of state to dissolve parliament on a legal base contested by the parties) or if it was only a means of pressure, which I do not approve, but which turned out to be effective.

[Kulakowska] Has the experience of one year in power changed the "former communists" of the SLD?

[Mazowiecki] The elections of the fall of 1993 that brought the former communists to power did not constitute what you in France call a political "alternance" [changeover of political power between parties]. It was the return of a party that emerged from the structures of the former regime and that has not entirely overcome its heritage. Even if the Right is partially responsible for these parties' return to power, the triumphant behavior they exhibit is no less significant. I do not want to say that the former system is back, but the former officials are recovering their positions, especially in the countryside. Moreover, this government has blocked the land reform that was to lead to decentralization.

[Kulakowska] How do you view the prospects of joining the EU and NATO structures? Do you not fear that the country's image has been tarnished by these latest events?

[Mazowiecki] All Western observers have recently confirmed in various reports Poland's good level of development. Today the economic reform is continuing regardlesss of sudden political changes. Moreover, the current crisis has shown that there is a genuine social and political rejection of any antidemocratic solution. That is why it would be too soon to question the Polish people's capacity to enter the European structures and NATO. Poland is a country of strategic importance for Central Europe. Everything that serves to stabilize Poland serves to stabilize Europe, and vice versa. Using the crisis as a pretext to call that into question would be to have short-term vision. It would be a bad sign for us, but also for Europe because that would mean that the West accepts a "gray zone" in our region.

Politicians View Strzembosz's Election Chances

WS1502080095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Walesa May 'Seduce and Jilt' Voters of Rightist Candidate; Who Will Want Strzembosz?"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The candidacy of Adam Strzembosz for president is supported by activists of several rightist parties, such as the Center Accord [PC], Union for Real Politics [UPR], Conservative Party, and the Conservative Coalition. However, also some regional activists of the Freedom Union [UW] are collecting signatures on lists supporting the first president of the Supreme Court [Strzembosz] before the party's primary.

Even though, as Janusz Korwin-Mikke stresses, it is not parties but people who elect the president, political groupings carry the burden of working out the political program of a candidate, collecting 100,000 signatures, and waging an election campaign. This is why the course of the elections, and even their result, depends largely, though not directly, on support from political parties.

Adam Strzembosz is being encouraged to run in the presidential race by numerous rightist groupings (such as PC and UPR); even in those parties which are officially against him (such as ZChN) there are supporters of the professor. "Whether or not part of the right wing supports Strzembosz depends on Lech Walesa."

Rightist parties are right now being tempted by the president, who wants to "seduce and jilt" them. "Walesa is creating his reserve political base; perhaps its foundation will be St. Catherine's Covenant," believes UPR's Stanislaw Michalkiewicz.

Also Andrzej Anusz of the Secretariat of Center Rightist Groupings [SUC] (which is the stimulator of the activities of St. Catherine's Covenant) does not conceal that the possibility of Strzembosz being supported by SUC (minor parties which have become stronger thanks to close cooperation with "Solidarity"—"S") and by the trade union itself largely depends on steps taken by Walesa.

Who Will "S" Choose?

"Now is the moment of waiting for Walesa to make a move. If he fails to dissolve the Sejm, he will lose all chances of being supported by the center right. Pro-Walesa factions in all parties will grow weaker and there will be room for another candidate, who may be Adam Strzembosz," says Anusz, even though he does not conceal the fact that the position taken by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "S" will be crucial for SUC. The union has so far been evading unequivocal declarations; it has been suggesting that the area of unification for the right wing and the union should be not the fielding of one candidate for president—no matter who he is—but cooperation before the constitutional referendum. However, when there appeared press reports suggesting that Marian Krzaklewski is unfavorably disposed toward the candidacy of Adam Strzembosz, the union's Press Office denied them immediately.

UW Will Not Want Strzembosz

According to [Movement of the Third Republic Chairman] Jan Parys, Strzembosz has recently supported abolition for communist dignitaries in order to gain UW's support in the presidential elections. Barbara Labuda also tried to frighten her party colleagues by saying that UW's leadership had already decided to support this "rightist candidate."

The candidacy of the professor has been submitted in UW and is being actively supported there by the party's activists from Tarnobrzeg. "I believe, however, that the first president of the Supreme Court has a limited chance of receiving UW's support, first and foremost because we do not evaluate very highly his chances of success in the elections," says Jan Krol, Sejm deputy and member of the UW National Council, quoting preelection ranking lists. "We certainly are not putting in question his moral authority. However, as president of the Supreme Court he was entitled to take a stand on many issues that were important to the state; still his opinions were not heard," says Krol, even though he concedes that "the views expressed by Professor Strzembosz, a reasonable and moderate man, do not go beyond the spectrum of UW's opinions."

Chances To Get to Runoff Elections

Strzembosz's supporters predict that he stands the best chance among rightist candidates of moving on to the runoff elections. "In the minds of the public, the only potential candidate of the right, apart from Lech Walesa, is Adam Strzembosz, even though his election campaign has not yet begun," says Jaroslaw Kaczynski. The PC chairman recalls the emotional statement by Strzembosz, supporting the decision of the Supreme Court that allowed journalists to be exempted from their professional secrets. Kaczynski admits that making this statement was not a very good idea.

"In Poland journalists constitute a separate political factor. As a lawyer, Professor Strzembosz was right; his statement proved that this is a man of principles. Now, a president who knows the law and who is a man of principles will be welcomed by a large portion of society," Kaczynski believes. "He can count on 15 to 20 percent support in the first round, which should be enough for him to run in the second part of the elections," believes Stanislaw Michalkiewicz.

Kwasniewski—Best Countercandidate

Who would be the toughest countercandidate to Professor Adam Strzembosz if he managed to make it to the runoff elections? On this, politicians' opinions are divided. "The incumbent president would be a more difficult opponent for Strzembosz than, for example, someone fielded by UW," believes SUC's Andrzej Anusz. "The person who would be most difficult to defeat is Jacek Kuron," says UPR's Stanislaw Michalkiewicz. "Olechowski would be dangerous to anyone if he ran instead of Walesa," believes Jaroslaw Kaczynski.

Whom would be the easiest countercandidate for Adam Strzembosz to defeat? It would probably be a candidate with his roots in the Polish People's Republic, fielded by

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the Democratic Left Alliance—Aleksander Kwasniewski, for instance. "He would not take voters away from Lech Walesa. He might at the most obtain the votes of the Union of Labor and part of UW; the anticommunist part of society would support the first president of the Supreme Court," says Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, and other politicians of the right wing agree with this opinion.

Poll Registers Lowest Spirits in Five Years

WS1402133295 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by "knysz": "CBOS on Our Morale: The Pessimists Win"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our spirits have not been this low for five years. Political wrangles between the president and the Sejm and government have caused social spirits to sag.

The Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] asked Poles last weekend about their spirits. The poll was carried out at the time when Lech Walesa was threatening to dissolve the Sejm and deputies were accusing him of a coup on democracy. This was before the president's Monday meeting with the Council of Elders and before the coalition's Tuesday decision to replace Prime Minister Pawlak with Jozef Oleksy.

As much as 68 percent of Poles are pessimistic about recent developments, as compared with 55 percent a month ago. In the same period of time, the number of optimists fell by 10 percent—from 28 to 18 percent.

The largest pessimists are manual workers and farmers: 75 percent of people within these two groups claim that "current domestic developments are going in the wrong direction." This is a very significant change, as thus far these were groups least critical of the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party government. The intelligentsia and white-collar workers are slightly less pessimistic (66 and 59 percent respectively).

What Is Up in Politics?

According to 64 percent—11 percent more than one month ago—the situation is bad. A mere 2 percent claim all is well. One in four of those polled are undecided, stating things are "neither good nor bad."

"We have not had such a poor assessment of the political situation since 1990," says CBOS. "Not even at the time of the most serious political conflict to date, when the file reviewing affair came up and Jan Olszewski's cabinet collapsed."

Most critical of the current political developments are businessmen, management cadres, and the intelligentsia—nearly three-fourths of the representatives of these groups are pessimists. Farmers, on the other hand, have shown less criticism this time—"only" 52 percent claimed our current political situation is bad.

What will our political culture be in one year's time? "Nothing will change," say 39 percent, and 21 percent predict it will get even worse. One in five hopes the politicians will come to their senses and things will improve.

The Economy Is Not Too Well

Farmers are most critical of the state of our economy—73 percent. Among intellectuals the figure is 44 percent, among intellectual workers 47 percent, and among skilled manual workers 46 percent.

Generally speaking, half of those polled claim the economic situation is bad, 34 percent—"neither good nor bad," and 8 percent—good.

Of those polled, 42 percent claim nothing will change in the coming year. One in four respondents says things will improve, and one in five that things will get worse.

The poll was carried out on 3-6 February on a sampling group of 1,223 Poles representative of the adult population of Poland.

Daily Reports Increased Smuggling From East

WS1502094595 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 14 Feb 95 p 11

[Article by Rafal Geremek in cooperation with Sylweriusz Dworakowski: "Smuggling via Air Is Flourishing: Flights Above the Chimney Tops"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the inhabitants of a small village, which has recently been the landing site for smugglers' planes, says that if you lay in hiding, you can watch a complete smuggling operation of "live merchandise," spirits, and cigarettes unfold. Who knows what else—the Border Guards do not rule out the smuggling of arms, drugs, and radioactive material.

The site of the operations is constantly changing—one would have to look for the intruders in every forest clearing along the border in three voivodships: Suwalki, Lomza, and Bialystok.

The procedure is always the same: In the light of day, a private plane or helicopter lands in a secluded clearing. About a dozen men jump out, usually Asians. Then a car drives up, whisking them away. Sometimes you can see them loading packages.

The "performers" have been playing their game of cat and mouse for two years now. The planes are unloaded immediately and the pilots head back for Lithuania, while the cars speed westward. All the police and border guards can do is interrogate eyewitnesses.

The Border Guards estimate there have been at least 30 such flights to date. It is difficult to estimate the real number, as the smugglers fly at low altitudes, where they cannot be

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detected by radar. They land at a distance of at least 50 km from the border, beyond reach of the Border Guards.

Locals keep on talking about the planes. The police and the Border Guards admit we are dealing with smuggling on an international scale. The spokesman for the head of General Staff Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda claims the flights intensified only last fall. He admits the possibility that arms could have been on board the planes. He believes the most important thing is that these planes are not armored craft.

"This is not a serious threat from the point of view of national security," he says. "Contraband is a problem for the Border Guards to solve."

Leszek Czech, commander of the Podlasie Border Guard Unit, says this is most of all a matter of pride: "They have the gall to fly right under our noses. Its humiliating that they have been playing cat and mouse with us this long, humiliating our state. I cannot shoot at them—the Geneva Conventions forbid that. Even if I do track them down, all I can do is chase them in my car, because we do not even have a helicopter."

Brisk Business for the Kolkhozniks

Sometimes a transport shipment is intercepted on its way. This was the case in the vicinity of Kolno (Lomza voivodship), where Polish recipients of illegal merchandise dropped by a Lithuanian helicopter were captured on 29 August of last year. Cartons of West brand cigarettes were confiscated. Suspects from the vicinities of Suwalki were released on bail. Court proceedings against the individuals are still underway .

On 27 September, 21 Afghans were detained near Tykocin. One of them confessed to paying a smuggling gang $2,000 to get him from Lithuania to Germany. The price is growing higher. It sometimes reaches as high as $3,000 per head. Business is brisk—an AN-2 plane can seat as many as 20 unfortunates at a time.

"Poland is only a stopover," says Commander Czech. "We deport all those detained back across the eastern border. The majority of them are Asian. They travel with their entire families and are extremely poor. The tribute they pay to the Mafia is usually their entire life possessions. They are a sorry sight. Some do not even have shoes."

Commander Czech confirms that an experienced pilot can fly with a planeload of hot merchandise at a speed of 180 km per hour, careening between glades and houses. He adds that none of them are in the military. "These are all former kolkhoz workers. Crop dusters land here all the time. It is said some planes are homemade craft."

The Russian Is a Friend

At 1120 on Tuesday, 24 January, two farmers from the village of Jaglowo (Suwalki voivodship), admired the finesse of a smuggler pilot flying underneath telephone lines and landing in a meadow.

"Must be a good pilot," said one of them, acknowledging the difficulty of flying a biplane through an open space just six meters high, between the phone lines and ground.

They also saw a mini bus with darkened windows for passengers and a dun LAZ, recovered from the Army for goods, pull up from the opposite direction. The Lomza license plates on the bus were later found to be forgeries.

On Saturday, 28 January, the Border Guards and police from Augustow organized an ambush to seize the flying intruders in the same vicinity. The smugglers aboard the AN-2 plane, however, realized a trap had been laid. The plane circled above the village of Jaziewo and headed back east.

"They must have been warned by someone," said the head of the district police in Augustow.

Everyone agrees the smugglers have their own people on this side of the border. The unemployment rate is very high in these areas, people are impoverished. The temptations are huge.

Our guide from the village of Podcisowek (a landing site last June) curses the day the easterners first came. He whines incessantly: "Just no names," "The Russian Mafia will burn us alive." "Jesus Christ, what have I done." His greatest fear is that the police will call on him to identify the perpetrators.

He saw the pilots from close up. Along with several other local farmers he helped start a biplane which had nosedived into a meadow. It took two hours to pull out the plane.

"How could we not have helped? They always taught us the Russians are our friends," he explains.

At the time, it seemed the plane was heaven-sent. Some men received 100,000 [zloty] notes. They held a little banquet the same day.

Our guide supposed something was amiss when he saw about a dozen "short, hairy" men leave in a red Volkswagen Transporter van.

A Real Smuggler Does Not Fear the Enemy

The air excursions began four years ago, when a Soviet citizen landed in a motorized glider and requested asylum.

The first instance of "live merchandise" smuggling took place on 3 October 1992. Two weeks later, a second incident followed. That flight landed the perpetrators in court. The police detained about a dozen refugees from India and Pakistan. They revealed that they were aided by Ukrainian pilots. Polish and Ukrainian Border Guards identified the perpetrators. During an investigation that lasted more than a year and a half, Colonel Lev Yonytschev (head of the ring) confessed to receiving

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$1,200 and 180,000 karbovantsi from Moldovan businessmen. He changed his line of defense at the trial. He said he and his family were blackmailed so he turned to his subordinates for help. He stated he wanted to confer the money to his regiment. The court in Lvov, however, did not believe him, ruling that Yonytschev could have easily put the blackmailers in jail. Besides, the court pointed out the colonel often repeated: "I am not afraid of any enemy." His colleague, helicopter pilot Yuriy Semida, was awarded several medals for his courage in Afghanistan.

The colonel was sentenced to six years of prison, the captain to five years in a labor camp. The others received more lenient sentences, and the regiment was dissolved.

To this day, except for the two cases described above, all of the flights have occurred without challenge.

Last Thursday, just outside Grajewo, a biplane broke a wing while landing. Once again cars sped to the plane, people darted into the vehicle, and merchandise was reloaded. The plane was then set on fire. Police with dogs combed the forest when the felons were already far away.

Kania Will Protect Us

Article 22 of a law on national air cover states: "The airspace of the Republic of Poland is protected by the Air Force and Air Defense, in cooperation with other units of the Armed Forces subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense and with the Border Guards." In practice, what that cooperation boils down to is that when a Border Guard unit sights a plane overhead (sometimes a military radar detects it), it informs an Air Force unit. These units decide whether it is worth sending a fighter to chase some tiny crop duster. It usually is not.

"It is very expensive to deploy a response unit," Lt. Col. Czekierda explains. "On Thursday, we sent fighter planes to chase a plane that was sighted at noon because we thought it might have been in some way connected to the Antonov that had crashed the same morning."

It sometimes does not make sense to send military planes because they fly at high altitudes, and the smugglers fly just above chimney tops.

The head of police in Augustow complains that the eastern border is wide open.

"In the 1960's, I served in the Border Guard Troops in Ustronie Morskie. We knew of every plane that took off from Tempelhof airport in Berlin," he reminisces with affection.

The People's Republic feared invasion from the West. That side of our border was guarded by 60 percent of our forces, with 20 percent in the middle, and 20 percent in the east.

"A restructuring of the Air Forces is to be carried out this year. Radar control units will be rearranged. We have to establish more such units if our borders are to be sealed tight, and that is very expensive. There is no money in the budget, the state keeps looking to see from whom it can take money. Unless the problem of these smugglers becomes a top state priority [there will not be money forthcoming]," says Lt. Col. Czekierda.

During a visit to Vilnius last December, Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski spoke sharply about the smuggler flights. The only problem is that Lithuanian border guards are currently in the process of restructuring.

The Podlasie Border Guards Unit has been appealing for a helicopter for a long time now. The Internal Affairs Ministry signed a contract with Swidnik [Polish helicopter plant] only in December. A Kania helicopter is to begin patrolling the northeastern border in June.

The Medical Aviation Units [Zespoly Lotnictwa Sanitarnego] suggested to Commander Czech that their Mi-2 (the smallest helicopter) could patrol the borders until the Kania craft arrive.

"I would have to at least put out money for fuel," says Czech. "And we cannot afford even that."

In 1992, officers of the Podlasie Border Guards Unit detained 585 illegal emigrants and smugglers on the "green border" and at checkpoints. Of that number, 53 were Indians, 18 Vietnamese, 16 Pakistanis, 5 Lebanese, and 12 Turks. A year later, the Border Guards returned 995 people, 121 of which were Asian. Last year the Border Guards caught 1,500 people—500 of them were Asian. Tamils and Chinese are being caught more and more frequently. This year, the Border Guards fear a wave of immigrants from the Caucasus.

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Communique on Euro-Atlantic Integration Strategy

AU1402211095 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 10 Feb 95 p 2

["Communique" from meeting between President Ion Iliescu and leaders of the parliamentary political parties on Romania's strategy for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures held in Bucharest on 8 February]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between Romanian president Ion Iliescu and the leaders of the parliamentary political parties took place at Cotroceni Palace on Wednesday, 8 February at the president's invitation. The meeting was also attended by the prime minister of Romania, the presidents of the two chambers of Parliament, members of the executive branch, and presidential advisers.

At the start of the meeting, Iliescu outlined the purpose of the meeting and emphasized the importance of cooperation and efficient coordination among all political forces, as well as between these forces and the various state institutions, in order to promote Romania's optimal integration into the European structures. This process has entered a new stage with the entering into effect of the accord on Romania's association to the European Union [EU] on 1 February 1995 and with the adoption of a "Strategy for Preparing the Adherence of Associated Countries from Central and East Europe to the EU " by the recent summit in Essen, which requires the drafting of a national strategy on European integration.

In view of the national dimension of this choice, Iliescu invited the leaders of the parliamentary political parties to express their opinions and to participate in the drafting of the appropriate documents. In his opinion, the strategy for European integration must rely on the national strategy for Romania's medium- and long-term economic development, to the drafting of which all the nation's creative forces should contribute. In this respect, President Iliescu welcomed the statement of the Romanian Parliament on the enforcement of the Accord on Romania's Association to the EU adopted by the joint meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate on 8 February 1995, a statement that highlights the consensus of all parliamentary political forces on this matter, as well as the determination to set up the special Joint Parliamentary Commission for European Integration.

The participants in the meeting expressed diverse opinions, which nevertheless highlighted the fact that the stage reached by Romania's integration into the complex EU structures is a real achievement as well as incontestable proof of the irreversible distance traveled by our country in the last five years. At the same time, the participants pointed out that this particular stage also presupposes the assumption of new and difficult responsibilities. The speakers considered that it is primarily necessary to define exactly the meaning of European integration and to explain in detail all the implications of this process to the personnel of the state institutions, the political forces, and the public at large.

In view of the fact that the majority of the politicians present at the discussions are members of Romania's Parliament, the discussions laid particular emphasis on the need to bring the country's legislation into harmony with the European legislation. In this connection, the participants pointed to the need to bring about appropriate adjustments in the activity of the new Joint Parliamentary Commission for European Integration, the Consultative National Council, and the Legislative Council. Likewise, they stressed the need for a broad campaign of information, at the level of each citizen as well as at the level of parliamentarians and public servants, in order to develop a national mentality and awareness favorable to European integration. In this connection, it was suggested that a program for training experts in this sphere should be drafted, in keeping with the long-term requirements of Romanian society.

In conclusion, thanking the participants in the meeting, the Romanian president again emphasized the importance of the moment currently being experienced by Romanian society and added that the Romanian Government has already worked out a draft framework for the national integration strategy to which each party can make its own contribution.

It was agreed that by the end of the following week, the political parties would advance nominal proposals for their representatives in the coordinating group, who together with the representatives of the government and the experts of the National Institute for Economic Research will work out both the national strategy for social and economic development and the integration strategy. Emphasizing that this is a national effort, President Iliescu called on Romania's parliament to rapidly adopt the laws necessary for speeding up economic reform, especially those having to do with the great privatization.

Likewise, Mr. Ion Iliescu suggested that when the national strategy for European integration is finalized, Romania should forward the official request for full adherence to the EU.

Ethnic Hungarian Leader on Threats Against UDMR

AU1502084295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 11 Feb 95 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Csaba Takacs, executive chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Ferenc Kepecs; place and date not given: "The RMDSZ Does Not Allow Itself To Be Blackmailed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Again and again, the prospect of banning the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ; in Romanian, UDMR] is held out in Romania. Is the purpose of this threat to make the Hungarian organization eventually give up its autonomy

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efforts in exchange for its survival? RMDSZ Executive Chairman Csaba Takacs answered our question.

[Takacs] This can be accepted as political speculation and it is likely that such procedures do exist. However, the RMDSZ's leaders are not people—at least not at the moment—who can be made to play this game, or who can be blackmailed this way.

[Kepecs] Do you believe the banning to be possible?

[Takacs] History shows that anything is possible in Romania when the extremists are in power. We are in a situation where the government party is at the mercy of nationalist forces: precisely, two explicitly anti-Hungarian parties. In other words, anything is possible. The reason for the RMDSZ's stance being so firm is not the fact that it does not consider the situation to be serious. In fact, certain indications point to the situation's getting more serious.

[Kepecs] What is the RMDSZ's position?

[Takacs] The RMDSZ maintains the program that it democratically and officially accepted and that has been authenticated by the partners, the international institutional systems with which the RMDSZ has contacts. We do not have any reservations on this issue, especially since we know that our position is not contradictory to Romania's interests or to international norms.

[Kepecs] You were dissatisfied with the national minority framework agreement that was signed in Strasbourg. Is this not a sign of your demanding more than the international norms?

[Takacs] It is possible that international norms do exist which do not yet propose the kind of autonomy and institutional framework that we want. However, many examples in Europe show that national minority and ethnic problems can be solved in the form that is desired by us.

[Kepecs] If the domestic political situation determines your possibilities to such an extent then does this also mean that improvement is impossible until this situation changes—namely, until the 1996 elections? Does this mean that you cannot make any progress in implementing your autonomy efforts until then?

[Takacs] Many factors can play a role in this. For example, Romania's foreign political isolation could even change the position of the extreme nationalist parties. However, it is also possible that, similarly to rump Yugoslavia, this country will choose even a complete isolation to achieve its domestic political goals. The situation is not completely clear; therefore, we cannot really draw long-term conclusions. However, the daily political tasks continue to exist, and I feel that the RMDSZ is trying to meet the requirements created by these tasks.

Frunda Calls CE Convention 'Step Backward'

95P20504A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Feb 95 p 2

[Statement by Senator Gyorgy Frunda: "The Framework-Convention on the Protection of Minorities Does Not Satisfy the Demands of the Hungarians in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyorgy Frunda, Romania's representative to the parliamentary session of the Council of Europe [CE], distributed a long statement in Strasbourg at the beginning of the week. In his text, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] senator said that the adoption of the framework-convention for the protection of national minorities marks a big step backward in the legal recognition of minority rights, and justified his statement by the current situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and of the UDMR, of which he painted a gloomy picture.

In a long historical presentation, the senator said that in the former socialist countries, for five decades the national minorities have been the target of a policy of forced assimilation, and he talked about the hopes they had after the changes in 1989 and 1990. He continued as follows:

[Frunda] The hopes of the national minorities seemed to be confirmed at the beginning of 1990: the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] adopted the Copenhagen final document, which called for those national minority rights that guaranteed the preservation of the national identity of the minority.

The CE, in turn, began to draft a document that would define national minorities and guarantee their basic rights, also providing European stability. After two years of discussions, Resolution 1201/1994 was adopted. This recommendation contained fewer rights than the final document of the Copenhagen CSCE conference. It was the first step backward in the area of the rights of national minorities.

During this period (1990-93), all the former socialist European countries asked for and obtained membership in the CE. One of the conditions for membership was the recognition of the rights of national minorities—acknowledging that their problem is not only a component of basic human rights but has also become a fundamental political problem affecting the stability of Europe as a whole.

When Resolution 1201 was adopted, the parliamentary session of the CE decided that this would become a protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. If this had been achieved, the situation of the national minorities in Central and East Europe would have been stabilized. Unfortunately, the CE's Ministerial Committee did not accept the recommendation of the parliamentary assembly. Recommendation 1201 did not become a protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights. The Ministerial Committee decided to adopt a framework-convention for the protection of national minorities and asked the parliamentary assembly of the CE to adopt a protocol on the cultural rights of national minorities.

The framework-convention for the protection of national minorities was adopted by the Council of Ministers and tomorrow, 1 February, it will be presented for signing. Unfortunately, the framework-convention is

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more restrictive than Recommendation 1201: It does not define the concept of "national minority" and does not provide for a number of rights that were included in Recommendation 1201 (for example the right to have autonomous authorities or a special status—Article 11 of the Recommendation). We can conclude that the adoption of this framework-convention is another step backward in protecting the rights of national minorities.

In addition, the Ministerial Committee recommended that the parliamentary assembly of the CE adopt a resolution on the cultural rights of national minorities that could become a protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights.

But we, the parliamentary assembly, must decide. We will adopt such a resolution or we will keep Recommendation 1201, and we will use all our means to convince the Ministerial Committee to accept Recommendation 1201. I know that this is very difficult, but I am pleading for the second solution, for the readoption of Recommendation 1201 and for recommending that the Ministerial Committee adopt this document as a protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights.

What makes me support this solution is not only the general picture in regard to the problem but the situation of the Hungarian minority in my country, Romania. At the end of 1989, the Hungarian minority in Romania created its own association, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], which in addition to stiving toward the general goals of a democratic party—democratization of the country, political pluralism, the establishment of a rule of law, respect for basic human rights—struggles to maintain, develop and express the national identity of Hungarians in Romania. The UDMR operates as an association for the protection of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and as a parliamentary political party, a party of which I am a member.

Consistent with the fundamental principles of democracy and of the rule of law, the UDMR applies, within its own ranks, the general principles of democracy, the separation of the decisionmaking and executive organs. In parliament, it fights for decentralization; local, cultural, and personal autonomy; education in the mother language; the free use of the mother language in local government and in the justice system on the local level; the possibility of using bilingual signs in the regions inhabited by the Hungarian minority, etc. Both by its program and by its activity, the UDMR has proven not only its European function but also its constitutionality and legality in Romania. Nevertheless, it has been the target of attack by extremist political parties ever since it was established. Certain political parties tried to ban ethnic parties—and, implicitly, the UDMR—when the Constitution was adopted in 1991. The assistance that we received from the CE was a determining factor in the adoption of constitutional provisions that permit the existence of political parties based on ethnic criteria and that should guarantee the right of the minorities to preserve, express, and develop their national identity.

Recently, the UDMR has been attacked more and more vehemently by the Romanian government and the political parties that support it. In January, a protocol was signed by the parties that form the government coalition: the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], the Greater Romania Party [PRM], and the Socialist Labor Party [PSM]. The last three parties are well known—known even internationally—for their intolerance, xenophobia, anti-Hungarianism, and anti-Semitism. In numerous successive statements, PUNR chairman Gheorghe Funar has been demanding not only the banning of the UDMR but also the removal of all UDMR members from the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Romanian Intelligence Service.

Thus, the ethnic "cleansing" of these ministries is being demanded! Along with this, the Romanian government notified the UDMR to dissolve the Council of Representatives (its decisionmaking political organ) and the Council of Local Mayors and Councillors and (the organ synchronizing their activity), or the government would "take the matter to the courts." The Ministry of Justice made public the "arguments" on the basis of which it was asking that the UDMR be declared unconstitutional, and a judge from the Constitutional Court said that the banning of the UDMR would not cause any negative international reactions. The demand that the UDMR be declared unconstitutional was supported by the PSM (whose leader is a former prime minister of the dictator Ceausescu) and the PRM (whose leader is known for his anti-Semitism and anti-Hungarianism). I believe that government threats against the internal organization of the UDMR represent a serious violation of the principle of political pluralism.

In this situation, the UDMR is defending its democratic organization and is supported by the democratic parties in Romania and by international assistance. We are aware that only through the integration of Romania into Europe can we obtain the legislation and application of our fundamental rights.

The situation of Hungarians in Romania and of the UDMR demonstrates the need to adopt European conventions that would guarantee the rights of national minorities. Their situation is not only their own problem but also the problem of the majority and of all Europe.

The European Community, and the CE, in particular, have the obligation to be consistent, to adopt a protocol in the European Convention on Human Rights that would, on the one hand, ensure European political stability and, on the other hand, guarantee the right to an identity for the national minorities in all spheres of public and private life.

Thank you for your attention.

Strasbourg, 31 January 1995

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Cernavoda Reactor To Use Domestic Fuel

AU1402185495 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 10 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Matei Dumitru: "The Next Uranium Delivery Will Be 10 Times More Expensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The process of filling Reactor Number 1 of Cernavoda nuclear power plant with nuclear fuel will start at the beginning of March. Due to the delayed arrival of the nuclear fuel, which had been expected on 23 December 1994, Romania has lost almost $35 million (a reactor produces $570,000-worth of electric power daily]. The verification of the 100 metric tons of natural uranium imported from the firm ZIRCATEC has been slowed down considerably by the fact that two out of seven containers of uranium were opened on the ship. Although the transportation expenses have been added to the $60 million—which represents the price of the nuclear fuel—the total value of the uranium was much lower than the uranium refueling process will cost in March 1996, when the reactor will be filled up with Romanian-made fuel.

The price of uranium powder in Romania is almost 10 times higher than the price on international markets. Nevertheless, in this case, political interests will again prevail. In Romania, the uranium deposits are very poor; however, considering that hundreds of thousands of people with the right to vote are working in the respective specialized mining units, these people cannot be rendered unemployed.

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Karadzic Warns on Cease-Fire, Contact Group Plan

LD1402183695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1753 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 14 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, warned in Banja Luka today that the current agreement on the four-month cessation of hostilities will be the last one that the Serbs accept before their final victory "if the international community fails to find a solution acceptable for all three sides by 1 May."

Speaking at an expanded meeting of municipal and local committees of the Serb Democratic Party, Karadzic said that the Serb army will respond to Muslim offensives by launching counteroffensives against all sensitive points of their territories.

"They will last until the international community offers a final and guaranteed solution to the conflict," Karadzic added, stressing that "in addition to internationl community, big powers also have to guarantee this solution."

"It is necessary to conclude an international agreement which will define the borders of all the newly created states on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina," the Srpska republic president said.

Speaking about the failed talks with the Contact Group for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Karadzic warned of "certain linguistic traps being offered in the new version of the plan."

"We were asked to accept the plan as the starting point for further negotiations, while we for our part asked that it should only be used as a basis for the continuation of negotiations," Karadzic said. He stressed that this plan, which the independent deputies to the Srpska republic people's assembly have also seen, restores integrity to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it precludes all solutions that are not in accordance with this concept.

Saying that the Contact Group in its approach is more than devoted to the idea of a single Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it demands that the plan be first accepted before negotiations can continue, Karadzic explained that this would mean that the Srpska republic must give to the Muslims 20 towns and 13 municipalities.

Serb Assembly's Letter to Milosevic

LD1402140895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1114 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 14 Feb (SRNA)—The People's Assembly of the Srpska republic sent a letter to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic after its session last night. The letter is aimed at resolving inter-Serb disputes. The following is the full text of the letter read out by deputy Slobodan Bijelic.

Respected Mr. President: We appeal to you in the hope that you still understand our problems and we aim to do everything we can to resolve the inter-Serb disputes. All of us will be held responsible before history and our contemporaries.

We were proud of you when you began the political struggle for the dignity of the Serb nation. We supported your standpoint on linking the issue of administrative borders with the secession. You had our full support for the idea of "all Serbs in one state"—we realized that idea in 1918. We were prepared to die in order to prevent the humiliation of Serbia.

We were proud when you withstood all pressures in The Hague and rejected the Hague Document. Had you not persevered on that occasion all Serb hopes of freedom and rights would have been lost.

We believe that you will again refuse to recognize Croatia and Bosnia this time around. Otherwise, your resistance in The Hague and our struggle for liberation would be futile.

The world has realized that the decision to recognize Croatia and Bosnia was a mistake. They are asking you to repeat this same mistake. We were relieved when Yugoslavia assumed responsibilities to guarantee the security of Serb Krajina in line with the Vance Plan.

The people remember us by our words but they judge us by our deeds.

Mr. President, what is happening?

The majority of our people in all Serb states are hoping that the sanctions, i.e. the punitive measures along the River Drina, are not real and that this is some kind of political game between our authorities.

At this moment, when our enemies are preparing the worst possible genocide and war of extermination against us, we must tell the truth to the people in all Serb lands. The truth is that the Drina is an iron curtain today and that no one and nothing can penetrate it.

Not only has this crushed our economy which fed and defended our people but our defense and preparations for resisting the enemy have also been threatened. We have been put into a cage as if we were beasts and not part of the freedom-loving Serb nation which is bleeding and paying with lives for the defense of overall Serb interests.

Our businessmen and representatives have been coming to see you with the best intention of having the heavy sanctions alleviated on the River Drina. What is the result of all these visits?

The blockade on the Drina has grown even stronger. An impression has been created that we will yield and accept

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the maps that our people rejected in the referendum. The international community, already prepared to offer us an acceptable solution, has been vacillating and deciding to continue the pressure, strengthening its illusion that we will succumb.

It has to be clear that all pressure, including the Drina blockade, will never [words indistinct] of a sovereign state, even though it will increase our suffering and threaten our defense.

All the Serbs have to be told this, because a great war against us is being prepared, a war that will determine the future of all the Serbs. This has to be clear to our friends and to the international community, which has to recognize reasons for the existence of the Srpska republic, whose recognition we demand.

We believe that the policy of yielding to pressure is as bad and perilous as is the division of the Serbs on any grounds.

Therefore, we appeal to you, Mr. President, to use your authority to restore the dignity of the Serbian policy and secure Serb state unification.

The West has proclaimed you, Mr. President, its last and only hope for the realization of its objectives in the Balkans. Its objectives, not the Serb ones!

Mr. President, we would like to be proud of you again. We would like you and other Serb leaders to be a hope for the realization of Serb objectives and an obstacle for the realization of our enemies' objectives. You can do that, together we can do that.

We can unite now and remain firm in the defense of our national and state interests. If you do not do it, history will never forgive you. If you would not do it, or are unable to do it, then at least remove the painful border on the Drina which divides genuine brethren.

This border has not been imposed on us by anybody else—hence, we should not expect others to remove it. Remove it so that it should fade out from our painful memories.

The survival of our people is at stake.

Ljubijankic Views Federation, Foreign Policy

AU1302190095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 95 p 8

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic by S. Lovrenovic in Sarajevo; date not given: "The European Strategic Direction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We asked Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic to comment on Bosnia-Herzegovina's foreign policy position after certain important factors in international politics shifted their position towards Bosnia. Of course, we also discussed controversial issues pertaining to Croatian-Bosniak relations within the Federation, even those that do not fall into the sphere of foreign affairs.

[Lovrenovic] Do you consider it necessary to clarify certain misunderstandings connected to the (non)implementation of the Federation Constitution that were reflected negatively in the example of Mostar?

[Ljubijankic] The problem of Mostar is of a moral nature. Politics must tackle this problem from the moral standpoint. I know that politics are not a moral code, but a ratio of power, but if you do not react from the moral standpoint towards an alarming amount of immoral occurrences, catastrophes like World War II happen. In 1939, the world was soothing Hitler. I consider it impossible to establish two cities in a city that has always been a mixture of civilizations and cultures. That would be a crime.

[Lovrenovic] Nevertheless, the mayors of both parts of Mostar recently said that the reason for many of Mostar's problems should be blamed on the slow implementation of the Federation Constitution.

[Ljubijankic] I would not say that the problems are of a legal nature. These are problems of a moral nature. The legal aspect is excellent, but we have neither the people nor the political will to implement it.

Without Widening the Gap

[Lovrenovic] How would you comment on the shift in U.S. foreign policy in relation to Bosnia and the fact that Warren Christopher advised the Bosnian leadership to hold direct negotiations with Karadzic and Pale?

[Ljubijankic] This is a result of events on the domestic political scene in the United States. On one side you have Congress and the Senate with a Republican majority, and on the other you have the Democratic administration headed by Clinton. In order to avoid widening the gap, Clinton's associates and Clinton are trying to initiate the solving of problems. At the same time, is it necessary to maintain any kind of communication between Congress and the administration. I do not believe that this is an essential and strategic shift in U.S. interests.

[Lovrenovic] Rumor from Washington has it that U.S. Ambassador Victor Jackovich might be withdrawn. Does this signal a change in U.S. policy?

[Ljubijankic] We have not received any official request for Mr. Jackovich's withdrawal. My only comment would be to say that Mr. Jackovich was and is a man who has a good understanding of the problem. He draws attention to the essence of the problem and tries to solve it.

Rose's Empty Promises

[Lovrenovic] How would you comment on British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind's praise of General Michael Rose, former UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] Commander in Bosnia, for his work in Bosnia and his results in the humanitarian sphere?

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[Ljubijankic] Gen. Rose was the best promoter of British policy. He was inconsistent. What he promised, he did not fulfill. For example, he was warned of the Serbs' air raid on Bihac 10 days before it occurred. I personally warned him, even earlier. He curtly said that the Serbian aircraft would be downed immediately. I warned him that the area was a border area and that there was a chance of the aircraft going unnoticed. He rejected this possibility and confirmed that he knew where Udbina airfield was. The development of events is well known, yet this is just one of the problems to which Rose reacted lightly. He revealed Great Britain's extremely biased position regarding the Serbs.

[Lovrenovic] What is your opinion of certain assessments published in West newspapers that, after the United States' change in policy, Bosnia-Herzegovina's foreign policy could completely turn to the Islamic countries?

[Ljubijankic] That is impossible. We are taking into account all the realities of the current world. We know the specific value of the Islamic countries' aid, but we also know our position in Europe. Our strategic direction is European and there is no chance of our radicalization and change of position regarding the United States.

We Accept Substantiated Remarks

[Lovrenovic] Although the Izetbegovic-Tudjman agreement provided for additional Croatian cadres in Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic missions, nothing has been done so far. Why?

[Ljubijankic] In 1993, the Croatian Democratic Community called on all Croats to withdraw from the diplomatic service. Some complied, others did not. Today, we have some 10 percent of Croats in the Foreign Ministry. This number should be greater and should reflect the true structure of the population. We are ready to accept this. It is quite another matter that, Mile Akmadzic's application notwithstanding, we have not received a single other application. We have employed a few people here, in Sarajevo. However, that is just part of the agreements. We also agreed on the control of customs, free passage of goods and people, things that were never implemented. Just recently, one of our diplomats returning from New York was quite unreasonably detained for three days when he was passing through Mostar. Goods are being held in the port of Ploce, so that the storage charges exceed the price of the goods. Ten thousand metric tons of oil were held, and we, who do not have money for paying storage charges, had to leave the oil. This is the crucial problem in Croat-Bosniak relations.

[Lovrenovic] What happened to Mr. Akmadzic's appointment?

[Ljubijankic] His application was received and assessed as an unsatisfactory solution. Mile Akmadzic used to be Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister and, during that time, worked on disintegrating Bosnia-Herzegovina. We shall take care that the people representing both the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are people who support Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, not those who wish to annihilate it.

[Lovrenovic] What would happen if the Croatian side were to address remarks to some personnel solutions on the Bosniak side?

[Ljubijankic] We would accept substantiated remarks.

[Lovrenovic] Who is supposed to be the arbitrator in such cases?

[Ljubijankic] There is no arbitrage. There is the Foreign Ministry and political circles. The Ministry is the government's operative body. This problem would have to be solved on the level of the Presidency of the Republic and Federation.

[Box, p 8]

Croatia's Logical Decision

[Lovrenovic] What is the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's position after the cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia? Will there be a similar decision in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ljubijankic] We are carefully monitoring and analyzing the development of events. Things could take various directions. There is no clear answer to the question of what the consequences of the withdrawal will be. I think that from the Croatian position, the decision is absolutely right because Croatian has been waiting for UNPROFOR to do something regarding the reintegration for three years now. Since UNPROFOR failed to do anything, the decision is logical. The one thing I do not know is whether the international community will be able to postpone the decision as it has done several times earlier.

Pejanovic, Iranian Ambassador Discuss Peace Plan

AU1402192895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and president of the Serbian Civic Council, received Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, today.

They held an exhaustive exchange of opinions regarding the continuation of the peace process and especially the possibilities for the organization of a tripartite meeting of Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic on the precondition that it succeeds. Namely, the meeting should be preceded by a consensus on carrying out mutual recognition of the sovereign states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

A mutually expressed opinion was that [words indistinct] should be done on the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina territory so that the continuation of the peace process would

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create the conditions for the prolongation of the cease-fire until an overall peace and political solution is found.

Zenica SDA Collects Funds for Army Soldiers

AU1402203795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Systemic solutions for the material position of all categories of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army members are springing to life with difficulty in practice. This was one of the reasons that spurred an action in Zenica called Let Us Reward Our Defenders. The action's results were presented at today's news conference, at which members of the headquarters of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] municipal committee spoke. Sefik Mujkic reports:

[Begin Mujkic recording] President [word indistinct] Babic and other members of the headquarters were unanimous in their assessment that over the past 14 days, which is how long this action has been going on, Zenica residents have demonstrated their high awareness and patriotism for our soldiers. Therefore, the action has been very successful.

Bearing in mind that [word indistinct] as of today a little more than 500,000 German marks [DM], that is 70 percent, were paid, and one can expect that the target figure of DM800,000 will be met. It is precisely today that the biggest payment so far—DM100,000—was made by the Zenica iron works, which, with its military production [namenska proizvodnja], has so far contributed the most toward the material strengthening of our army. [passage omitted] [end recording]

UBSD Criticizes Izetbegovic, TV Censorship

AU1402203995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's news conference by the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD], party Vice President Sejfudin Tokic stated that a recent Slavinovici case in Tuzla was a result of an attempt by certain ruling structures to destabilize and discredit Tuzla municipal authorities and Mayor Selim Beslagic.

Tokic emphasized that, in an open letter to Beslagic, President Alija Izetbegovic attacked the state policy, while, as Tokic emphasized, the Tuzla municipal authorities were simultaneously protecting the state policy.

In light of the announcement by President Izetbegovic on possible talks with war criminal Radovan Karadzic, the UBSD emphasized that Izetbegovic, as president of the presidency, does not have the mandate of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly for such a meeting and can thus only stage such talks as the president the Party of Democratic Action [SDA].

UBSD Vice President Sejfudin Tokic emphasized that a partial examination of the B-H Television program has shown that the television is speaking increasingly more from the positions of the SDA and increasingly less from the positions of the state policy. There is censorship present, which primarily takes the form of a personal and narrow party policy. The UBSD will, among other things, demand that promotional spots of all parliamentary parties be included in the program or else the SDA will withdraw its promotional spot.

Muslims Refuse To Attend Sarajevo Airport Talks

LD1502101895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0932 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 14 Feb [date as received] (SRNA)—The meeting between representatives of the Army of the Srpska republic [VRS], the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], and the Muslim Army scheduled for tomorrow at Sarajevo airport has been cancelled because the Muslim side has refused to come to the talks, SRNA has learned from Serb military sources.

Rasim Delic, commander of the Muslim army, had previously already told Britain's General Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he would not meet the commanders of the VRS and the HVO because of the "situation in Bihac."

Tomorrow's meeting was supposed to be part of the regular meeting of the joint central commission charged with implementing the agreement on the four-month cessation of hostilities.

SRNA Blames Washington for Peace Talks Failure

LD1502114695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0932 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Commentary by SRNA correspondent Srdja Trifkovic; received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] London, 15 Feb (SRNA)—The Serbs in the Srpska republic are right to decide to end the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina by inflicting a complete military defeat on the Muslims without waiting for the world to realize that it is not possible to force the Serb people to obey "the gentle mercy" of Izetbegovic and Tudjman.

The Srpska republic leadership, which is regularly blamed for causing the stagnation of the peace process, is no longer willing to play the game of making unilateral gestures of goodwill. While everyone across the Atlantic—from the White House and Capitol Hill to the media—is repeating that "Radovan Karadzic must be isolated," who can then blame the Serbs if they begin to feel that all scope for further concessions has been exhausted. Without flexibility on the other side of the negotiating table, which matches the Serb readiness for talks, no result can be achieved.

An opportunity to achieve peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina was lost last month when the Contact

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Group came to Pale to demand that the Serbs accept its "peace plan" as a starting point and absolute precondition for further talks. The situation was absurd because had the Srpska republic leadership said "yes" to the plan, which consists only of maps, there would not have been anything left to negotiate! At the negotiating table, the Serbs were requested to accept the defeat which they have avoided at the front.

All informed observers have agreed that a big concession by the Srpska republic leadership was the agreement reached with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, according to which further negotiations should be resumed "on the basis of the Contact Group plan." The difference between this formulation and the Contact Group's demand that the Serbs "accept the plan as a starting point for further talks" might appear a little semantic and too legalistic only to an uninformed person, but in essence there is a fundamental difference between the two. It was this that led to the demise of the peace process.

So the killing will go on. But the time has not yet come for this. The Serbs are fed up with and tired of the war and willing to negotiate. However, western mediators still lack the goodwill to be impartial and encourage the Muslim side to demonstrate realism. Instead of negotiating directly with the Srpska republic leadership, Washington is offering Belgrade a temporary lifting of economic sanctions in return for recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other former Yugoslav republics. Who can really blame the Serbs if they begin to feel that all the scope for further concessions has been exhausted?

The military defeat of the Muslims appears to be the only way to make the Muslim regime in Sarajevo desist from its impossible ambition for a single unitary Bosnian state in which the Islamic minority will rule over a Christian majority. The responsibility for the consequences of this uncompromising behavior in the negotiating process will lie with the Muslim regime in Sarajevo and its mentors in Washington. The Serbs did not begin this war. They did not want it, and they still hope the terrible suffering can be brought to an end.

Commentary Views U.S. Stance on Peace Talks

AU1202211195 Pale JAVNOST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Feb 95 pp 4-5

[Commentary by Kolja Besarovic: "The American Simultaneous"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the famous Contact Group, after many months of ignoring the leadership of the Srpska republic, made an official visit to Pale again, but they returned from there empty handed. Of course this failure, as both sides point out, should not be understood as the end, that is, the definite collapse of the restored negotiating process. However, the fact remains that the first official meeting of the leadership of the Srpska republic and the delegation of five powers, which was held after Jimmy Carter had prepared the terrain, ended without any essentially encouraging achievements.

Why the results of Carter's conditionally encouraging mission were not used for further progress on this occasion is certainly a question that requires a broader analysis, and even the consideration of certain, so far only hypothetical assumptions. What is undisputable as of now, though, is the fact that at the Pale meeting the representatives of the Contact Group deliberately ignored some key elements of the Carter-Karadzic agreement, particularly the clause underlining that the plan of the Contact Group will serve only as a basis for further negotiations. Instead, they insisted even this time on the already presented and for the Serbian side unacceptable demand, or to be more precise, they demanded that Karadzic and his aides, before any further negotiations, publicly accept the aforementioned plan in its original, unchanged form.

Logic

It is clear that the Serbian side, despite its cooperativeness, could not agree to such already presented demands, so in that sense its rejection of such an approach represents a logical and expected move. However, at least at first sight the logic of the Contact Group's members is less understandable. As if nothing had happened or changed in the meantime, they entered the new negotiating round with unmodified and essentially outdated offers. It is really hard to believe that the members of the Contact Group, or rather their bosses, had any illusions that this time the leadership of the Srpska republic might consent to the blackmail that it had been rejecting so persistently even in far more unfavorable conditions. So the question is raised: What are the basic motives, or rather the background of their—for the time being formally unchanged—attitude toward the peace plan?

First and foremost, while assessing the new situation one should keep in mind the fact that the interests of the members of the Contact Group are not only different, but are in many aspects opposing. Or to be even more concrete, it is no secret that the European part of the five-member arbitration commission views with distrust and dissatisfaction the results of Carter's mediating mission, fearing that it is actually an attempt by the U.S. Administration to squeeze the other interested factors out of the region by pushing its own separate peace settlement. In the context of such relations it seems normal that the dissatisfied are trying to keep things under control, that is, within the confines of the joint body and its formally alive, but actually "stillborn child." On the other hand, Washington does not want to be the first to take over the role of the main culprit for the collapse of the Contact Group owing to its unilateral moves.

Of course, a different thing is (or it appears so at least), if the further support for the joint, but practically unfeasible and futile platform brings about if not its formal death, then at least the essential marginalization of the Contact

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Group's role. In that sense it is possible that the theories supported by those who consider the recent Washington-Pale solidarity (remaining within common boundaries) with rigid attitudes of other European partners to be perfidious undermining of the Contact Group, that is, the preparation for the imposition of their own, modified plan, are really true. Even if such plans were realistic, a totally different question is whether the Clinton administration is capable of throwing all other interested factors out of the game. The U.S. influence in the Bosnian and Yugoslav peace efforts so far has been undoubtedly dominant. This, however, does not mean that the leading world power may completely ignore the interests of the Europeans, even if it wants to, in the first place those of its officially main partners, the Germans, but also—although unwillingly—of the Russians, who, regardless of the so far maximally demonstrated "partnership cooperativeness" and the current problems with Chechnya, still represent a factor that must be taken into account.

Trap

It seems that even more important than this is the question of real goals of the possible U.S. unilateral engagement in settling the Bosnian crisis, that is, in finding the answer to the dilemma to what extent the recently announced realistic policy of the Democratic administration is really motivated by the desire to harmonize the U.S. and Serbian interests. Even in the case that the recent, conditionally speaking, change of Washington's policy is not limited exclusively by strategic needs of the Muslims' winter survival and recovery, one should be, to put it mildly, quite reserved toward the achievements and real goals of Clinton's policy. Simply, provided even that the Clinton administration really wants to undo the Bosnian knot for its own internal political reasons, it will hardly manage to overcome its own limitations, which urge it to try to appeal to the Serbs while at the same time without upsetting the Muslims and their Republican congressmen too much. Such cautious cosmetic modifications most probably will not please anyone, and consequently will not make possible a diplomatic escape from the so far vicious circle.

We are analyzing all this under the presumption that the current administration in Washington truly wants a global settlement, acceptable to both sides, of the Serbian-American dispute, in which the Bosnian crisis is just one, certainly extremely important segment. Do Clinton and those who are designing U.S. foreign policy right now really want that compromise, or is their flirting with Pale actually a perfidious trap aimed at thwarting the unification of the Serbian states by separate settlements of the Yugoslav crises and deepening of inter-Serbian disagreements?

The very fact that it is precisely the Americans who initiated the recent humiliating UN Security Council resolution on the temporary prolongation of the partly lifted sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], as well as that they had a key role in drafting the latest minicontact plan on the peaceful reintegration of the republic of Serbian Krajina into the constitutional framework of Croatia, shows that Washington has not given up its major anti-Serbian goals. Therefore it cannot be excluded that the U.S. Administration—just like it was encouraging Belgrade several months ago to take a peacemaking course, which, by the way, has not been adequately rewarded at all—is trying to do a similar thing with Pale. Perhaps it is really ready to make certain concessions on the territorial and constitutional plane, of course provided that the leadership of the Srpska republic accepts a separate solution by which the border at the Drina River will be preserved (if not even cemented).

It is certain that the leadership of the Srpska republic is aware of this danger, which, however, does not mean that in the current circumstances it should pull out of the peace negotiations and thus call into question certain encouraging effects of Carter's mission. Whether those effects will be sufficient so that any kind of realistic compromise can be achieved relatively soon, or whether a new escalation of the conflict will come about, will, unfortunately, depend least on the Serbian side. The key role in further efforts to settle the crisis does not belong to the Contact Group either, regardless of whether it will come apart, become modified, or continue its inefficient peacemaking activities. In all this it is not doubtful at all that this illegitimate arbitration body has deepened the Bosnian crisis by its ultimate solutions.

The problem lies, however, in the fact that the existing Contact Group, just like its predecessors, peace negotiators Carrington, Cutilhiero, Vance, or Owen, is only an instrument by which the chief international factors are enforcing their own interests.

Serb Doctor Leaving Sarajevo in UN Vehicle

AU1402200295 Paris AFP in English 2000 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP)—A Bosnian Serb doctor was caught Tuesday [14 February] trying to sneak out of Sarajevo aboard an armoured vehicle manned by Russian UN peacekeepers, the United Nations said. Unless they have special authorization, UN troops are barred from transporting civilians out of the city.

The doctor, identified as Vojin Boskovic, was nabbed at a checkpoint manned by Bosnian Government troops in the Dobrinja district, near the airport. He was seen getting out of the vehicle with his arms raised in the air. Boskovic said he wanted to go from Dobrinja, where he works in a hospital, to the Serb-held suburb of Lukavica.

UN spokeswoman Myriam Sochacki said the armoured vehicle was coming back from an anti-sniper mission on the main boulevard of Sarajevo, known as Sniper's Alley,

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when the two Russian crewmen in it took on Boskovic as a passenger. She said the United Nations was investigating the incident.

Croat Municipality Formed in Tuzla

LD1402195895 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian [as received]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tuzla Croats have proclaimed the Croat municipality of Soli. We have a report by our correspondent Zvonimir Banovic:

[Banovic] Members of the county committee of the Croatian Democratic Union of Soli held their 37th session yesterday, and unanimously adopted a political declaration on the proclamation of the municipality of Soli. The committee is of the opinion that the declaration is the expression of the Soli Croats' political will; its legal implementation will take place at an opportune political moment, i.e., when a law regulating this sphere is passed at the federal level. [passage omitted]

The session was also devoted to the current political and security situation in Soli. It was assessed as being very complex, with no sign of improvement. To the contrary, the impression was gained that individual cases have started acquiring forms of organized behavior, with the blessing of the Muslim political and army leadership. The county committee believes that there is a limit of tolerance; otherwise the Croat community will take measures to protect the historical interests of the Croat people.

General Santic on HVO Operations in Bihac Zone

LD1402171395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Units of the Croat Defense Council [HVO] have taken part in the operations for the liberation of the southern parts of the Bihac protected zone. We managed to establish contact with Major General Vlado Santic, commander of the HVO units for Bihac. Here is what General Santic said about the great successes of the HVO in the Bihac area:

[Begin Santic recording] From 8 to 14 February the Serb-chetnik aggression was directed against the front held by the HVO. However, on 13 and 14 February the combined forces of the HVO and the 5th Corps launched a counterattack, dealing a major blow to the Serb-chetnik aggressor. We liberated Croat territory, the following Croat villages: Vucjak, Zavalje, Mali Skocaj, [word indistinct], Veliki Skocaj; we managed to mop up the whole of Mount Pljesevica; we reached the state border with the Republic of Croatia and established ourselves along 35 km of its length.

This is how things should work from now on, for we will not stop at that. I believe that we can expect a fresh offensive because they are bringing in reinforcements. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen. [end recording]

Serbs Planning Offensives on Bihac Region

AU1502095595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representative Herve Gourmelon has stated that the forces of Karadzic's Serbs are planning an offensive on Bihac, since they have brought reinforcements of 1,200 men into the region. According to UNPROFOR, there are already 35,000 Serb aggressor soldiers in the region.

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Granic Predicts Recognition by Serbia

AU1002213195 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Feb 95 pp 4-5

[Interview with Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, by Ante Gugo in Zagreb on 2 February: "'We Will Continue To Pursue a Peaceful Solution, but We Will Not Negotiate for 50 Years!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Mate Granic is, after the president of the Republic, certainly the most competent person to discuss all the repercussions of cancelling the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate and the partial acceptance of the Z-4 plan. Although it may seem at first glance that Croatia is losing its position on the international scene, Granic is still difficult to find in Zagreb. From his frequent trips to his minister colleagues messages arrive that are not very clear to ordinary people. We thus hear that countries that were friends until only recently have been expressing concern about Croatia's actions. Does that mean that our friends are now against us? Granic will not answer this question directly, but it is possible to find out that German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who has been the loudest in expressing his concern over the past few weeks, has invited Granic for a private visit, during which they are supposed to watch the Davis Cup tennis match between the German and Croatian national teams together. We asked Dr. Granic for an interview because of the many important current events (cancelling the UNPROFOR mandate, the Z-4 plan, and strengthening the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation).

[Gugo] The cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, Owen and Stoltenberg, visited Zagreb today (Thursday) [2 February]. What was the reason for their visit? Did they offer some new plan?

[Granic] There were no new plans or ideas to start them. Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg support the continuation of the economic negotiations and the start of the third stage of the peace plan, which involves the political reintegration of the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia. No new initiatives were taken.

Recognition of Croatia by Serbia

[Gugo] Why had they been to Belgrade before Zagreb?

[Granic] Serbia's President Milosevic refused to receive the representatives of the mini Contact Group, Z-4, who were supposed to deliver the proposal for the peace plan for the Republic of Croatia. This happened at the time when attempts were being made to prepare a meeting between myself and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, which interested protagonists believe could be useful for the promotion of the peace process.

[Gugo] Why did Milosevic refuse to accept the representatives of the mini Contact Group? Can this be viewed as his lack of interest in the events in the Republic of Croatia, or is it a sign of his categorical refusal of the offered plan?

[Granic] There is no doubt that Milosevic has a great influence at the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia, which is based on several facts. This is an ethnically cleansed territory, on which there is no economic activity and which depends on international humanitarian aid. In maintaining the established power, the ruling elite is completely dependent on Serbia, both in the military-material and political sense. Milosevic is aware that the complete normalization of relations in these areas can only take place after the mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY. Belgrade would thus tell the authorities of the rebel Serbs in Croatia in the most direct way that he recognizes the territorial integrity of Croatia, which would certainly make them less adamant in refusing the offered peace solutions within Croatia's state sovereignty. Milosevic is not prepared to accept the Z-4 plan at the moment, since he would thus mark the end of the process of integrating the occupied Croatian areas in Serbia, which at the same time implies the beginning of the reintegration of these areas into the state and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. Serbia, that is, the FRY, will most certainly recognize Croatia, but this is a question of certain processes that have to take place in Serbia.

[Gugo] There has been talk that you may go to Belgrade to talk to Vladislav Jovanovic. Will this meeting ever take place?

[Granic] This meeting has been prepared over a long period. We are interested in the final normalization of Croat-Serb relations and particularly in talks about two fundamental things. The first is the problem of prisoners and missing persons and we will keep insisting on it until we know the final and real fate of the last person on the list. The other topic of our conversation will be the mutual recognition, that is, the act that should stop the process of integrating the occupied Croatian areas in Serbia. I am supposed to travel to Belgrade in the course of this month.

The Serbs Have Armed Themselves Even Better

[Gugo] Do you think that it is realistic to expect Serbia to recognize Croatia at this political moment?

[Granic] There are signals indicating that this is so. We will see how soon this recognition can take place, but Serbia will certainly recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders.

[Gugo] In order to reach the solution to the problem of the occupied areas sooner, the UNPROFOR mandate has been cancelled. On what important facts is the decision based that the present peace forces are useless in Croatia?

[Granic] This decision was carefully prepared. We should bear in mind that the areas of the Republic of

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Croatia that are called UNPA [UN Protected Area] are ethnically cleansed, which they were not at the beginning of the UNPROFOR mandate. Therefore, ethnic cleansing was carried out during the mandate of these peace forces and they were not able to do anything to prevent it. Not one UN Security Council resolution has been implemented, especially those concerning the return of the refugees to their homes. It turned out that the present international peace forces would not be able to implement the return of the refugees in 50 years. One of UNPROFOR's tasks was to disarm all the paramilitary formations in the Republic of Croatia. Instead, the rebel Serbs have acquired even more weapons, mainly from Serbia, which was possible because UNPROFOR never implemented Security Council Resolution 769, concerning the guaranteeing of Croatia's borders. We decided that Croatia had got into a situation in which it could finally say "no" to a mandate of the peace forces with which no progress had been made. That does not mean that, in solving this problem, we are refusing to cooperate with the international community. On the contrary, we will intensify our cooperation with international organizations, especially the OSCE. We want to reach a peaceful solution through joint efforts with the international community.

At the time we were trying to attain international recognition, which was in mid-1991, James Baker, the then U.S. secretary of state, said openly that he opposed the independence of the Yugoslav republics and that he would consider it an internal political problem. Six months later, the world recognized us and our international reputation was becoming better, consolidating our position. This can best be seen in the content of the Security Council resolutions regarding the Republic of Croatia. With each new resolution more and more of our demands were acknowledged, but at the same time there was the absurd situation in which the international community was not allowed to use force to implement its own decisions. We thus got into this stalemate, which does not suit us. We are aware of the reality of the warnings from the international community that armed conflicts could easily break out. We hope that the authorities in the occupied areas are aware of their inferiority in relation to the Republic of Croatia, especially regarding their military potential. Even if they mobilized all their men, they could not hold off our army along such a long frontline. Expectations that Serbia could be dragged into the war are not realistic, since Serbia dos not want to risk more sanctions, additional isolation by the international community, and other things from which it may not recover for a long, long time. The Bosnian Serbs might be dragged into a possible conflict in Croatia, but they must also be aware that each man they move against Croatia would make the frontline against the forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation weaker. I think that these facts should stop the rebel Serbs from starting an armed conflict. We will persist in searching for a peaceful solution, but we will not agree to options involving negotiations for the next 50 years.

[Gugo] Is there a possibility that the international community might force Croatia to accept something that would not be called UNPROFOR, but would in reality be a new UNPROFOR?

[Granic] No, there is no such possibility. If we look at the basic UN documents, we will see that the Republic of Croatia is fully entitled to solve the problem of rebellion on its own territory. At the same time, the international community has no right to protect the results of aggression. If we add to this the fact that President Tudjman could, in a certain situation, send a letter to each country that is providing soldiers for the peace forces in Croatia, saying that he does not guarantee the safety of its soldiers, I doubt that there would be any willingness to force Croatia to accept forces that it does not want to accept.

Negotiations Will Be Continued

[Gugo] Do you believe that it is really possible that UNPROFOR will withdraw from the separation lines between the Croatian Army and the Serb paramilitary formations without an armed conflict occuring?

[Granic] Of course it is possible. Croatia has opted for a peaceful solution and the balance of powers is such that an armed conflict does not suit the rebel Serbs. It is possible that they are counting on the help of Serbia or the Bosnian Serbs, and that they will provoke us, as our friends, particularly the United States, have pointed out, but in that case the rebel Serbs would realize what a mistake they had made. At any rate, there are possibilities of war not breaking out when UNPROFOR moves out. I believe that the authorities in the occupied areas are beginning to realize how much the economic reintegration with Croatia will mean to them, and it is not possible to implement this reintegration without political reintegration. It is not difficult to weigh up what reintegration into the state and legal system of Croatia would brings and what war would bring.

[Gugo] Do you think there is the sufficient will among the rebel Serbs to continue the implementation of the agreement on economic cooperation? The next stage is supposed to involve the opening of the Zagreb-Vinkovci railroad and the Zagreb-Split railroad via Knin. If this happens, all the borders with Croatia on which Martic and the others have been insisting so much will be destroyed.

[Granic] Judging from the negotiations that are under way, such a will does exist and the negotiations will continue. Croatia will not be the first to withdraw from the negotiations, as long as they are making progress.

Mock's Support

[Gugo] You recently visited Minister Mock in Vienna, during which you were also received by Austrian President Klestil. We heard that Austria understood Croatia's reasons for cancelling the UNPROFOR mandate. Do

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you think that in the event war breaks out, the international community would understand Croatia's need to liberate its occupied territories by force?

[Granic] Minister Mock expressed great understanding on the part of Austria, as well as his own, for the situation in the occupied territories and everything else resulting from the fact that part of the territory is occupied and that hundreds of thousands of people cannot return to their homes. He expressed support for the Croatian authorities in the assessment that this situation is unacceptable and that the peace forces have been inefficient. At the same time, concern was expressed about the possibility of armed coflicts breaking out, but understanding was confirmed for Croatia's need to reintegrate the occupied territories into its state and legal system. President Klestil repeated these positions. The fact is that Austria will not give up or stall the signing of the already arranged and prepared agreements—particularly the economic ones—and it will also support us in the Council of Europe and the EU. We can establish that we have the support of all of West Europe. When they express concern about the possibility of conflicts breaking out, that does not mean that they condemn us for it, but that they express fear of the possible consequences, primarily of this turning into an all-out war throughout region. They are very cautious because of the possible humanitarian consequences, since they would have to bear part of the burden.

[Gugo] It would be logical to expect our neighbors to be more worried about this than some other West European countries.

[Granic] The neighboring countries do not feel directly threatened by the possibility of conflicts. Like other European countries, they are concerned with the possible humanitarian consequences. I must emphasize that we appreciate the positions and opinions of our neighbors and that we are trying to cooperate with them, as well as with the entire international community. The new Slovenian foreign minister, Mr. Thaler, chose the Republic of Croatia to be the first country to visit in his new capacity. Our ambassador was the first diplomat whom he received.

There Are Pressures

[Gugo] Will the cancellation of the UNPROFOR mandate prevent Croatia from joining European integration organizations?

[Granic] There are certain pressures. Some agreements have been prolonged for several weeks, but I think that the possible outbreak of conflicts will not eventually prevent Croatia from joining Europe. Final reports that should decide on Croatia's admission are expected any day now in the Council of Europe and we are expecting the reports to be positive. We expect the European representative and Dutch Ambassador Hans van der Broek to visit within the next few weeks. There are plans for me to visit some European countries, too, all of which speaks in favor of the fact that Europe has continued good cooperation with Croatia. The caution in anticipating the development of the situation should not be taken as European rejection of Croatia.

[Gugo] What is your comment on Juppe's new peace initiative?

[Granic] If such a conference (a Balkan summit with the mediation of international forces) were to be well prepared, the final solution for peace in the region might be achieved. However, such a conference would have to be thoroughly prepared, since a superficial organization could cause more harm than good. We do not want to waste three more years negotiating at unprepared conferences. President Tudjman proposed a similar conference almost two years ago in his peace initiative.

[Gugo] Do you think it is realistic to expect NATO land forces to come to Croatia and seize the Croatian border with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia?

[Granic] We have been demanding that for three years. This was realistic at one stage. If the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina had been signed, we would have had about 50,000 Western soldiers, half of whom would be Americans, deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the border with Croatia, too. The only realistic thing to be expected now is for NATO forces to help with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, which must leave in a highly dignified way with our gratitude to each country that provided soldiers and our individual gratitude to each wounded soldier and each family who lost someone in Croatia.

Assessment of the Z-4 Plan

[Gugo] The public is familiar with the Z-4 plan, which contains many details implying the establishment of a Serbian state in Croatia: currency, flag, coat of arms, language, script, and president. The plan uses the term "Krajina" without any reservations and also anticipates a government with ministers that would not have to answer to anyone in Croatia. What is your comment on the fact that someone has decided to offer a plan that no country that values its sovereignty could accept?

[Granic] I will stick to the political assessment of the plan. The public, parliament, and the government will make their decision about the plan very soon and I have no doubt about the decision being unanimous. The positive thing in the plan is that the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia is confirmed and that the 11 municipalities in which the Serbs were in a majority prior to the aggression against Croatia are separated from the territory of western and eastern Slavonia and Baranja. The idea of federalizing Croatia, which plants the seeds for a possible secession of the Serbs from Croatia, is completely unacceptable to us. Other unacceptable elements are the degree of political autonomy offered to the Serbs and the mechanisms of international control that would effectively supervise the federalization of Croatia. We are prepared to negotiate, but we will never accept a plan that was made according to the

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model of a state within a state and that anticipates elements of future secession. Since you asked me how come such a plan was made, I must say that part of the reason is the insufficient knowledge about the real political situation in these areas.

[Gugo] Bearing in mind what is happening in Chechnya; it is strange that such plan was signed by a Russian ambassador, whose country is using weapons against everything this plan is offering the Serbs on the occupied territories of Croatia.

[Granic] The situation in Chechnya has certainly had some impact on the more acceptable positions of the Russian Federation concerning the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia and the need to reintegrate the occupied territories.

[Box, p 4]

We Respect the Decisions of the Constitutional Court

[Gugo] Today the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has suspended parts of the Statute of the Istria County concerning its right to conclude international agreements on its own. Could you comment on the aspiration of the leadership of Istria County to conclude international agreements independently of the state authorities?

[Granic] Croatia will provide full support to all the counties on their way to accepting all European standards, including the way to regional European cooperation. As far as getting out of the framework of the Constitution is concerned, the Croatian Government will be against it, and we will acknowledge all the decisions of the Constitutional Court and be firm about implementing them.

[Box, p 5]

No Alternative for Croats and Bosniaks

[Gugo] If Croatia is economically and financially isolated from Europe, is there a possibility of being tied to the cash flows of the Islamic countries? What is your assessment of the process of establishing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation?

[Granic] In the case of isolation, Croatia will primarily rely on itself. However, there have been no such indications. The negotiations with the IMF have been going as planned and the talks with the Paris Club are continuing. Croatia's influence with the Islamic countries is increasing. Prime Minister Valentic has had a very successful tour of the Far East and we are expecting Indonesian President Suharto to visit Croatia and meet with President Tudjman. In mid-1995 we expect President Tudjman to visit some important Islamic countries. We are trying to establish good cooperation with every country that wants it; this is an accepted fact worldwide.

As far as the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is concerned, it is important to emphasize that the first stage of the Washington Agreements, the halting of all conflicts, has been successfully implemented, as has the release of prisoners and the resolution of the humanitarian issue. Now we should work on the issues of the return of the refugees and the establishment of the cantons, and the work on establishing a joint military command is of particular importance. The reason there has been a standstill in implementing these issues is not a refusal to establish the federation, but the difference in the approach to implementing certain actions. Federation is a form that guarantees the survival of the Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is therefore no alternative either for the Bosniaks or the Croats. For the Muslim-Bosniak people the Federation is a question of survival and joining Europe, and for the Croats it represents the question of survival in individual parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The vast majority of Islamic countries do not support the idea of establishing an independent Islamic state or any other form of fundamentalist state in this part of Europe. I firmly believe that the majority of the Muslim-Bosniak people do not want an Islamic state, either. Croatia will firmly support the establishment of the Federation, which is why the meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, took place. There will be several more meetings with the mediation of friendly countries. The Federation, firmly tied to the Republic of Croatia, should be the basis for negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs and future peace and stability in the region.

Martic: Pressure To Stop UNPROFOR Departure

LD1402155295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1337 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Jan (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], said at a news conference in Belgrade today that the role of the Blue Helmets is crucial in efforts to find a peaceful resolution for the RSK and Croatia.

The possible departure of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] poses a threat to the resumption of the negotiations and to peace in the region, Martic pointed out at the International Press Center. The RSK president recalled that Krajina has recently signed an agreement on peace and the renewal of economic cooperation with Zagreb, after five years of conflict with Croatia caused by the secession of that former Yugoslav republic and, as he pointed out, the Nazi policy of the Croatian leadership. Krajina thus demonstrated its readiness to solve the conflict with Croatia in a peaceful manner, Martic said.

"We are of the opinion that there is no peace plan which could survive without the presence of peacekeeping troops. Due to Croatia's threats regarding the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate, we did not even want to consider the mini Contact Group plan," Martic said.

"The world must force Croatia to abandon its decision to terminate the mandate of peacekeeping troops. Those

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international power brokers who decide to support Croatia in this decision will, by doing so, support the war option," he said.

Martic stressed that Krajina has fully complied with the fundamental principles of the Vance plan which does not prejudice a political solution and guarantees that the peacekeeping forces will stay until a peace solution to the conflict is found. According to him, in recent talks with the top leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia, an unambiguous promise was made that Yugoslavia would strictly comply with the obligations deriving from the Vance plan and will protect Krajina if the peacekeeping forces leave and Croatia launches an aggression.

"We belive that President Milosevic is right in urging Krajina and Croatia to resolve mutual disputes through direct contacts," Martic said in reply to a journalist's question on how he assesses Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to receive members of the mini Contact Group.

According to Martic, the RSK and the Srpska republic signed a declaration in Prijedor in October 1992 by which the two Serb states pledged mutual defense, among other things.

"We have not been hiding the fact that we help each other in defense of the Serb lands. Anyway, we are one nation and we are prepared to help each other, which is best illustrated by the large number of volunteers who contacted the Belgrade-based Association of Serbs from RSK," Martic said.

Martic confirmed that contacts between certain politicians from Italy and RSK have been established, and that there is an initiative for him to undertake a visit to Italy. He recalled that Krajina was the first to begin returning seized land to Italians and that an Italian is a deputy to the Krajina Assembly.

Friendly messages have also been sent from Istria and Dalmatia; Krajina wishes to develop good relations with these regions and their people, Martic said.

'Consequences' of Withdrawal

AU1502085695 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Report on Croatian Serb leader Milan Martic's news conference by Zeljko Avramovic in Belgrade; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Avramovic] The Croatian leadership's decision to cancel the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate after 31 March was prompted by Germany with the aim of pressuring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into recognizing Croatia by 31 March, Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], told a news conference. Moreover, this decision is a result of Croatia's great internal destabilization and the only way that Tudjman can unite the government and the opposition is to opt for war, he stressed.

However, if the international community wants peace and wishes to prevent the war from spreading, it will do everything to see that the peace forces remain. If, however, they do not want this, they will have to shoulder the responsibility for all the possible consequences. The RSK has had correct relations with UNPROFOR. They will continue to be so during UNPROFOR's withdrawal. The RSK will not in any way prevent UNPROFOR's withdrawal, Martic stated emphatically.

As far as relations with Croatia were concerned, Martic said that UNPROFOR's role in all negotiations hitherto had been immense and that not a single agreement would have been achieved without their mediation. It is a big question whether the RSK and Croatia will be able to negotiate without UNPROFOR.

Finally, Martic told the many journalists present that the RSK supported peace and a peaceful solution to all controversial issues, but any peace agreement could only be successful if the peace forces remained at the borders of the RSK after 31 March.

Serbia 'Will Protect Krajina'

AU1502094195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Martic, leader of the Krajina Serbs, has confirmed that, in his recent talks with the leadership of Serbia and the self-styled Yugoslavia, the Krajina Serbs were given an unequivocal promise that so-called Yugoslavia will protect Krajina in the event that the peacekeeping forces leave and in the event of a possible attack by Croatia. Martic claims that despite international pressure, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic will not recognize Croatia. I do not think that there is any possibility whatsoever of any Serbian politician recognizing Croatia within its earlier [raniji] borders, Martic said.

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Gligorov on Greek Stance, Albanian Minority

BR1502114495 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 14 Feb 95 pp 16-17

[Article on interview with President Kiro Gligorov by Claus Dithmer in Skopje; date of interview not given: "Europe Is Turning Its Back on Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje—Four hostile neighbors, an economy in ruins, and massive unemployment. This is the reality Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov is faced with.

He is worried about the future of his country, but he is still a friendly, smiling man who receives us in the beautiful presidential office in the parliament, Sobranje, in the capital city of Skopje:

"Denmark will always be a friend of Macedonia," he said, alluding to the fact that Denmark, more than any other European country, has pleaded Macedonia's case.

However, he makes no secret of the fact that his country cannot live on the sympathy alone which pours in from most of the EU—with the exception of Greece, which closed its border with Macedonia a year ago and has blocked EU aid to Macedonia ever since.

"We are left to ourselves. We are not receiving any reasonable compensation for the economic and social effects the embargo has had on us," he said.

Kiro Gligorov knows that Macedonia is losing more than half a billion kroner a month because of the two embargoes: The one Greece has inflicted on the country and the one against northern neighbor Serbia which Macedonia is obliged to maintain.

Europe's Responsibility

"We are pleased about the recognition we receive for being the only former Yugoslav republic which has managed to keep war at bay."

"But we are disappointed that Europe has been content with fine words, rather than helping us repair the damage the sanctions cause our society."

"The EU should be able to convince the Greeks that they are reacting in a completely irrational way. Their reaction is a major threat to peace and stability in the southern Balkans."

Greece has an nonrecognized Macedonian minority in its northern province of the same name, which it does not want to see getting secessionist ideas.

The Greeks demand that Macedonia renounce its name and the use of the red-gold flag with the virgina sun, which is thought to have been Alexander the Great's royal symbol. The use of these symbols is viewed in Athens as theft of the Greek cultural heritage.

"Europe knows very well that several earlier Balkan wars have had their origin in Macedonia and its relations with its neighbors. If Europe—in its eagerness not to tread on the Greeks' toes—is waiting for war to start, they are not living up to their responsibility: to promote peace and stability."

Social Problems

"I am afraid that we will soon have serious social problems, because many people are poor and unemployed due to the two embargoes.

"We are carrying out the economic reforms which we agreed on with the IMF and the World Bank, and we have inflation under control. But at the same time we have two closed borders: to the south and to the north. That puts this country in serious danger."

That means that Macedonia's trade is unnecessarily expensive, because it has to take a huge detour via Bulgaria or via impoverished Albania.

"Nevertheless we have maintained peace and stability in the area.

"All this tells us that the problem with Greece must be solved very soon. We have to learn from the example of Bosnia—before it is too late."

The Name Is Our Identity

[Dithmer] Is it possible to imagine that Macedonia could give in to the Greeks and change its name, flag, and constitution? If for no other reason than to show magnanimity and avoid problems?

[Gligorov] We have done everything we can to assure Greece that we have no territorial claims of any kind.

Among other things we have amended our constitution to show that we have no desire to become involved in the internal affairs of our neighbors. And we have shown Greece goodwill by being admitted to the United Nations under a name which is inappropriate for us. ([The] Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, FYROM—DET FRI AKTUELT editor's note).

However Greece is still demanding that we change the name our republic has had for the last 50 years, and which is so closely tied to our whole identity. No one has the right to demand that other nations should change their names.

We are therefore proposing that we sign a mutual agreement guaranteeing the permanence of our common border. Guaranteed by the United Nations. [Gligorov ends]

Dialogue and Tolerance

Macedonia is made up of of many different ethnic groups. Macedonians make up the majority, while Albanians make up between 23 and 40 percent. In addition there are Turks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, and gypsies.

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As such a large minority, the Albanians want constitutionally guaranteed equality with the Macedonians who only want to give them the status of a minority.

[Dithmer] How do you view the problems between the Albanians and the Macedonians?

[Gligorov] All countries which have more than one nationality inside their borders have problems. The question is how they can be solved.

We solve our problems by dialogue and tolerance within our legal democratic institutions. Albanians are thus represented in our parliament and in our government.

[Dithmer] The Albanians say that the election in November was not fair or just.

[Gligorov] We had more than 300 observers during the election. Both the OSCE and Council of Europe reports on the election say that the election was free and democratic.

Abuse of Hospitality

[Dithmer] Macedonia recently closed the Albanian university in Tetovo and handed over 18 Kosovo Albanians to the Serbian police. This looks like an escalation against the Albanians.

[Gligorov] Neither of these two things indicates a change in our policies, either in respect to our minorities or in respect to Kosovo.

Just think of the consequences of such a university—outside the country's educational system and educational concept. We would put those studying there at risk. They would not receive a satisfactory education and would therefore not be able to find work. It would become a social problem.

As far as the deported Kosovo Albanians are concerned, I can tell you that they involved themselves in political activities which were harmful to Macedonia without having residence permits. They were undermining this country and abused our hospitality.

Question of Principles

[Dithmer] Can the Albanian wish for constitutionally guaranteed equality ever be on the agenda?

[Gligorov] No, this cannot be done under our constitution. But it is also a matter of principles.

It is internationally recognized that a nationality which has its own homeland is to be regarded as a minority in another state. The Albanians have Albania, and the Turks have Turkey. We, therefore, adhere to international principles. Just as Sweden has a Finnish minority and Finland has a Swedish minority.

But that does not mean that the Albanians will have fewer rights than anyone else in this country. On the contrary.

Skopje Seeks 'UN-Brokered Dialogue' With Greece

AU1402175495 Paris AFP in English 1645 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Feb 14 (AFP)—Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] said Tuesday it wanted a UN-brokered dialogue with Greece, which has slapped an embargo on the neighbouring former Yugoslav republic for taking the name of its own northern province.

"We are favourable to the pursuit of dialogue and the establishment of a direct dialogue, but only under the auspices of the United Nations," Foreign Minister Krsto Crvenkovski [first name as received] told reporters. The minister recently met UN mediator Cyrus Vance in New York without making any headway on relaunching bilateral talks suspended since May 1993.

"No new idea or initiative appeared" during the meeting with Vance, Crvenkovski said. He refused to admit defeat, despite the economic blockade imposed by Athens a year ago.

The embargo has forced Macedonia to reroute all its trading, leading to a financial crisis as its two million people grapple with the enormous extra costs imposed by the move, which has cut the link with the Greek Aegean port of Salonika, blocking oil supplies and rail traffic. Greece imposed the embargo to protest at what it terms usurpation of the name of its northern province by the former Yugoslav republic, and accuses Macedonia of having territorial designs.

Athens faces censure by the European Court of Justice over its move, which Skopje says has to date cost it half a billion dollars.

Albanian-Language University To Open 15 Feb

LD1402181295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—The academic year at the Shqiptar [ethnic Albanian] "university" in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] will be solemnly inaugurated in Tetovo tomorrow, "vice chancellor" Fadilj Sulejmani announced today.

Upon his return from the United States, where he had been on an 11-day visit at the invitation of the U.S. Congress, Sulejmani told reporters in Tetovo that he would "go through with the university, regardless of the Skopje authorities' opposition." He said that the "university" has received strong material, political, and moral support from the United States.

Tomorrow's new academic year ceremonies will also be attended by an American delegation headed by Joseph Diogardi, an American politician of Albanian descent,

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Sulejmani said. According to him, his American collocutors "expressed consternation and regret at the Macedonian authorities' attempts to prevent Albanians from receiving university education on the threshold of the 21st Century."

Sulejmani said that during his stay in the United States he had agreed on scientific cooperation and student exchange with George Washington University.

It is expected that, besides members of the "vice chancellor's office," the "senate," and 600 students, the opening ceremony of the illegal "university" in Tetovo will be attended by all the leaders of Shqiptar political parties, their ministers in the FYROM Government, and deputies to the Macedonian parliament. The FYROM Constitution does not permit the opening of universities in the languages of national minorities.

UNPROFOR: Border With Serbia 'Peaceful'

LD1502113995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1112 GMT 15 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Feb. 15 (TANJUG)—The U.N. Protection Force commander for The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Norwegian Gen. Tringve Telefsen, said late Tuesday that the FYROM border with the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia was peaceful and voiced optimism that controversial issues in the region would be resolved. Gen. Telefsen is to be relieved by Finnish Gen. Johe Engstrom on Wednesday.

Gen. Telefsen told the FYROM television that FYROM's northern border was now completely peaceful and that tensions that took place in the spring of 1994 were history and would not happen again. He said that, for the 13 months of his command of the U.N. troops in FYROM, he had ten times contacted representatives of the Army of Yugoslavia and their professional and benevolent approach had brought about the present degree of understanding and stability on the border with Serbia, which had not been yet officially established.

Gen. Telefsen recommended that his successor, Gen. Engstrom, should continue cooperation with the representatives of the Army of Yugoslavia and also with the representatives of FYROM's western neighbor Albania. The U.N. Protection Force has been deployed in FYROM on a 'pre-emptive diplomacy' mission to monitor the country's northern and western borders. U.N. troops in FYROM are composed of the U.S. and Nordic battalions having 550 troops each.

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Federal

Balkan Countries To Hold Annual Trade Fairs

LD1402184795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1624 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Representatives of trade fair organizations of Balkan countries agreed on Tuesday in Belgrade to hold permanent fairs on economic achievements in these countries. Such fairs would be held annually and the host would be the country from which comes the chairman of the Association of Balkan Chambers (ABC) with one-year mandate. It was agreed that the host of the first fair would be the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Tuesday meeting, organized by the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy and the Belgrade fair, was attended by the director of the Yugoslav fairs and the representatives from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Mihajlo Milojevic, chairman of the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy and chairman of the Association of Balkan Chambers, said the idea to organize fairs exhibiting the economic achievements of Balkan countries originated from the Association of Balkan Chambers.

One of the most important activities of this association is to boost the exchange of information on economic possibilities and achievements of Balkan countries, and the fair of Balkan countries would be one of the means for fulfilling that aim, Milojevic said. The participants in the Tuesday meeting also discussed the possible ways for closer association and improvement of the economic cooperation of the Balkan countries in the period between the holding of the fairs as it was agreed at the meeting.

Establishment of Yugoslav-Bulgarian Business Club

LD1302181995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1756 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—A Yugoslav-Bulgarian business club was set up in Belgrade today. Its purpose will be to further promote and develop trade between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and the Balkans as a whole.

According to Sinisa Zaric, deputy chairman of the newly formed club, the primary motive for founding the club is to enable "Serb businessmen in Bulgaria to feel at home and to have their own business premises there, and to enable Bulgarian businessmen to have the same thing in Belgrade."

Stefan Peykov, chairman of the International Economic and Trade Center in Burgas, and chairman of the trade mission there, was elected chairman of the club.

Serbia

Martic Cites Belgrade's 'Assurances' of Protection

AU1502114795 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 95 p 14

[Article by N. Trklja: "Martic: If the World Wants Peace, It Will Force Croatia To Abandon Its Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Croatia's decision to cancel the mandate of the UN forces was made at the wink of Croatia's permanent sponsor Germany and its aim is to exert pressure on Yugoslavia to recognize Croatia within its AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders by 31 March." This was stated by Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina at a news conference in the International Press Center in Belgrade yesterday.

"The other reason for this move by General Franjo Tudjman," as Martic said "is the unstable political situation in Croatia. The only way Tudjman can unite the ruling party and the opposition and control the situation fully is the war option and a joint approach [nastup] toward the Serbs. However," Martic said, "not all of the regions of Croatia are in the mood for a war against Krajina. We have recently received signals of that mood. The entire regions of Istria and Dalmatia are against war. There are even certain people in Dalmatia who are striving for a settlement of the dispute through peaceful means, the recognition of Krajina, and the establishment of economic cooperation," he said.

According to Milan Martic, the republic of Serbian Krajina has not studied the Z-4 plan, nor does it know what the document contains. The decision not to study the plan of the mini Contact Group was made because no peace plans stand a chance of succeeding unless the UN peacekeeping forces stay in the republic of Serbian Krajina with an unchanged mandate. "We do not agree with changes to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate, because we support the decisions of the Vance plan that was signed with the consent of three sides, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and the republic of Serbian Krajina. The Vance plan stresses that the peacekeeping forces should not prejudice a political solution and that they should remain until a political solution has been found, but in a peaceful way." Martic said.

"If UNPROFOR decides to leave Krajina, we will not prevent them from doing that. We want to show to the world that we favor peace and the only way not to endanger peace is for the peace forces to stay. If the world really wants peace, then it will make an effort and force Croatia to abandon its decision. If the world does not do that, then it does not care about peace. A war will probably flare up in that case and it could easily spread to other regions," Martic said.

Asked about Yugoslavia's guarantees in the event of aggression on Krajina, its president said that, according to the Vance plan, such guarantees exist not only in

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spoken, but also in written form. According to Martic, Yugoslavia has taken it upon itself to protect Krajina in the event of the peacekeeping forces withdrawing. The republic of Serbian Krajina president said that during a series of talks with leading people in Yugoslavia and Serbia he was given assurances that they would adhere to the promises made earlier.

Asked what will happen if Yugoslavia recognizes Croatia, Martic said that he did not believe that there is a politician in Serbia or Yugoslavia who was prepared to recognize Croatia within its AVNOJ borders.

Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg

LD1502120295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1148 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this morning received David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Serbian president's office has announced.

In the talks, views were exchanged on all important aspects of, and prospects for advancing the peace process and ending the crisis by political means in the area of former Yugoslavia.

Oppositionists Pledge Support for Studio B TV

LD1402205995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1953 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—A meeting was held at the Studio B premises today between the chairmen of four parliamentary opposition parties and Studio B Director Dragan Kojadinovic. Serbian Radical Party [SRS] Chairman, Vojislav Seselj, Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] Chairman Vuk Draskovic, Democratic Party [DS] Chairman Zoran Djindjic, and Serbia Democratic Party [DSS] Chairman Dr. Vojislav Kostunica were in attendance.

A report broadcast this evening by Studio B says that unanimous support was given to Studio B and other independent media, and "the regime's attempt to exert complete control over the press, radio and television was condemned." Joint activities were considered and full agreement was reached on applying all forms of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary campaign.

The chairmen of the four parties reached full agreement that they will jointly submit a request for holding an extraordinary session of the Serbian Assembly at which, it was said, there should be discussion of "the increasingly difficult position of the independent media in general and the systematic pressure, harassment and other forms of threats to which Studio B has been exposed in particular."

It was also agreed to organize a protest meeting to which the representatives of other independent media and professional associations will be invited. The technical organization of the protest meeting will be carried out by the SRS, the DS, and the DSS, while SPO members and sympathizers will join in. The date and venue of the protest meeting is to be announced later.

"If the regime fails to desist from its intention of suffocating the independent media, agreement was reached that the deputies of the four parties will walk out of the Federal Assembly, the Republic's Assembly, and the city assembly. The public will be informed at a later date of all the other forms of resistance," it says in the text of the item broadcast in the current affairs program of independent TV Studio B.

SPO Chairman Comments

LD1402174295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—Chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] Vuk Draskovic offered today to the Democratic Party [DS] and the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] to organize a protest rally against the strangulation of independent media, which had been put forward by SPO.

At a news conference Draskovic said "enough with the old practice where only the SPO is on the attack, receives bullets and is imprisoned, and then is accused of being a mob and vandal."

The SPO leader criticized a letter sent to the SPO by the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], DS, and DSS that says that "unilaterally announcing and organizing a rally, particularly in the form of an ultimatum, only disturbs the necessary agreement and makes such protest rallies unsuccessful in advance."

According to Draskovic, the SPO has not determined the date, place, or topic of the rally; it has only called for an agreement to be reached on holding a rally.

"We look forward to that meeting. SPO members will join it, even if a decision is reached that the SPO president should not take part in the rally in order to make it a success," Draskovic said. He added that SPO was "forced to this sort of defeatism."

The agreement signed yesterday between the SRS, DS, and DSS was described by Draskovic as aimed against the SPO. He said that the text of the draft agreement, accepted by the main committee of the SPO on 11 February, was "completely revised" yesterday, which "resulted in a totally different proposal."

Draskovic said that the SPO had learned about the alteration of the agreement's text, and that he refused to go and sign it because "he does not frequent silly gatherings." [passage omitted]

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BORBA Suing NASA BORBA

AU1402142595 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11-12 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by D.Stankovic: "'BORBA' Demands Seizure and Ban of 'NASA BORBA'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The state-owned Newspaper Publishing Company [NIP] "Borba" on 2 February filed a lawsuit with the Belgrade Commercial Court proposing the urgent taking of temporary measures against NASA BORBA for—the lawsuit specifies—violating the plaintiff's right to the logo [zig] of the names BORBA and NASA BORBA, and the graphic presentation of the name BORBA achieved by adding the word NASA. NASA BORBA is also being sued for unfair competition.

The court is asked to pass a decision banning Fininvest from printing and marketing the newspaper under the name NASA BORBA. Moreover, the decision should order the seizure of all copies already published under the name. The court is further requested to order the defendant's manager to withdraw from the market all copies of the paper bearing the NASA BORBA logo within 48 hours after receiving the court's decision.

The representative for NIP "BORBA," attorney M.S. Delic, said that "it is true that the typeface used to depict the defendant's logo containing the word 'BORBA' is very different," but "the plaintiff's logo has a black and white patent which implies the right to use all colors and combinations of colors, including the combination of the colors blue and white, which the defendant is using to print and market its products." On the basis of this, the attorney concluded that "one can distinguish" between the defendant's logo and that of the plaintiff's "only if the average reader pays particular attention," since both papers are sold in the same places. The only thing the attorney failed to explain is how readers can confuse black and blue.

NIP "BORBA" is demanding that our paper pay compensation for material and consequential damage because BORBA's logos "have lost their exclusivity and the ability to remind the average reader that the products, that is, the newspapers that he has become accustomed to buying, are no longer of the same quality to which he has become accustomed over time." The attorney, of course, did not enclose evidence on BORBA's circulation following its takeover by Mr. Dragutin Brcin, in his suit against NASA BORBA

The initial lawsuit has been expanded with an accusation against NASA BORBA claiming that the paper's masthead—claims Mr. Delic—falsely lists the year of issue as "Year LXXIII," rather than 1995, illustrating the express intention of Fininvest and NASA BORBA to confuse the average reader.

It is expected that the court will establish who is wrong.

Fodor Urges Preparations for Export Activities

LD1402144795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1249 GMT 14 Feb 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zrenjanin, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Serbian Industry Minister Oskar Fodor has advised the directors of major companies in Serbia to ask for bank loans to stimulate exports despite the economic embargo.

Speaking in the town of Zrenjanin, in Serbia's northern Vojvodina province, Fodor said the recently signed economic cooperation agreement with Russia and permanenet economic contacts with Yugoslavia's neighbors were steps towards reestablishing economic trends and exports.

Domestic and foreign economists estimate that in the May 1992-Aug. 1994 period, Yugoslavia suffered losses amounting to 45 billion dollars due to the United Nations sanctions. Fodor said that the metal-processing industry could play an important role in reviving exports.

PRC Embassy Paneled With Radioactive Granite

AU1402211995 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Feb 95 p 11

[Article by S. Moravcevic: "Walls Full of Radioactivity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The inside of the new building of the Chinese Embassy in Novi Beograd is panelled with radioactive granite! This has been confirmed by measurements carried out by experts of the Vinca Nuclear Sciences Institute. The Roso Balmoral marble [as published] contains radioactive tritium 232 of an intensity twice the permitted level.

Although the Ministry for Environmental Protection warned the builders that this granite is extremely harmful to human health, construction work was not stopped and the embassy building is expected to be completed in a few days.

The so-far carefully treasured friendly relations with China may now be brought into question as Wang Yemeing, Chinese consul in Belgrade, demands that the 349 square meters of radioactive granite panelling be taken off the embassy walls. The case has thus attained international proportions. [passage omitted]

The disputed granite was brought from Finland with the help of the Italian firm Luigi Antonilli and imported by the Belgrade Terra Trade firm. Terra Trade Director Vladimir Sekrevski thinks that the "fuss" being made is not justified as Roso Balmoral plates have been imported for several years. So far, nobody has imposed any bans on Terra Trade. The same granite was used to panel the interior of the Intercontinental Hotel, the

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Electricity Distribution Board near the Hyatt Hotel, the facade of Montinvest at Vracar, the new building of the Radio and Television of Serbia, and many others. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Bukoshi Denies Conflicts Among Kosovar Leadership

AU1502111995 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 14 Feb 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by G.M. on meeting of Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, place and date not given: "We Have No Other Way but That of Independence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Asked if he could give a more concrete assessment of his work as prime minister and his relations with other members of the government and the political leadership in Kosova, Mr. Bukoshi asserted that his commitment as prime minister and the government's commitment as an institution stemmed from political convictions for a solution of the problem of Kosova and from continual consultation with his colleagues, especially President Rugova. Today's meeting with you is one such form of consultation, from which the government can only benefit for its future work. Differences that may have been noticed here and there in some statements for the media, assessing our work and the situation in Kosova, must not distress you, because it is not these things but a brutal occupation that has caused the serious situation in our homeland. In the final analysis, it should be clear to you that all Albanians are the same to the Belgrade regime regardless of what one or the other may say. What is most important is the fact of which you may be certain that there is no essential opposition between me or the government of the Republic of Kosova and the rest of the political leadership in Kosova. The fact that I, too, express my views as an individual over some specific issues cannot be interpreted as essential disagreement with the rest of Kosova's political leadership.

The assertions of those who accuse the government of playing politics on the boulevards of Europe and leveling charges against the remainder of the leadership in Kosova are malicious and untenable inventions. Bujar Bukoshi replied to a question by saying that the Government of the Republic of Kosova is very determined to do its job and it is precisely for this reason that the political leadership in Kosova supports it.

Asked about the effect of exiles' fulfilling their obligations to the Kosova Government's funds and the importance of this for the state of Kosova, Mr. Bukoshi replied that even though these obligations have been fulfilled so far on a purely voluntary basis, the work done so far and the results achieved testify to a high sense of patriotism among our people toward the state of Kosova. These funds are the main source of finance for the activities of the state of Kosova. Regardless of the fact that the account bears the name the Kosova Fund our government does not divide Albanians into those of Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro, or regions of southern Serbia. The government will use its resources wherever in the Albanian territories cases of need arise, and therefore deserves the respect of all our exiles.

Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi also replied to the question of whether he had appointed Nazmi Hyseni as a representative of the government and of the Albanians of Kosova, as has long been rumored among Albanian exiles in Switzerland. Hyseni has not been appointed a representative of the government of the Republic of Kosova in Switzerland, but Mr. Hyseni has been issued a permit by the government of Kosova in order to do certain jobs for it in Switzerland, Bujar Bukoshi said.

Asked for his opinion on our daily press, specifically RILINDJA, and whether he thought this paper was "political, nonpolitical, independent, dependent, a party organ, or the paper of Albanian businessmen whose advertisements take up a lot of space," Prime Minister Bukoshi said that RILINDJA, under the specific conditions in which we work, is first of all a news daily, and has performed this role informing our exiles about political trends both in the homeland and the world at large. I cannot give myself the professional right to provide a broader assessment of the work of the Editorial Board in Prishtina, Switzerland, and Tirana, but I can appeal to all three centers for a greater commitment to the mission they have set themselves.

Prime Minister Bukoshi replied to many other questions from those present. Mr. Isa Mustafa provided supplementary clarification about the funds of the Kosova Government. The Kosova Fund, he said, is a government institution. The three percent [tax collected by the Kosova Government on earnings of Kosovars working abroad] is a constitutional obligation for all citizens of the Republic of Kosova, while calling it a "voluntary commitment" is, under our circumstances, a political interpretation, because we are unable here to apply state sanctions against those who do not carry out their civil responsibilities. Those who do not do their duty and rationalize this by claiming that it is voluntary, must realize that they are in debt to the state of Kosova. The obligation bears its present administrative title because we cannot legally extend our activity beyond the actual territory of the Republic of Kosova. However, we have striven in our political work to explain to our exiles that the fund is for all Albanians and in the interests of all Albanians.

Finally, concluding the meeting, Mr. Xhafer Shatrri, minister of information of the Republic of Kosova, appealed to our people not to exploit our exiles and the diaspora for party political, sectional interests. We have only one opponent and our work must be aimed solely against him and his allies, Shatrri said.

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Vojvodina

Third Hungarian Party To Be Formed

LD1402201795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1603 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Subotica, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—The Civilian Movement of Vojvodina Hungarians [GPVM], the third political party acting as a focus for the Hungarian minority in Serbia, is to be founded on 4 March this year.

Joszef Berec, chairman of the initiative committee for setting up the party, told TANJUG in this connection that he does not agree with the activities and policies of Andras Agoston and Ferenc Csubela, the leaders of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians.

Berec believes their objectives are unattainable and that the autonomy they advocate is leading to the encapsulation of the Hungarian national minority within a national framework. "We want to resolve the problems of daily life, something which will free Hungarians from disagreements with members of other nations which have been provoked by the demands for a third-rate and personality-based autonomy," he stressed.

Berec assessed that the initiative to set up the GPVM has met with significant approbation in Budapest and added that the Hungarian-language press in Serbia is attempting to hush up these activities because it is under the strong influence of supporters of Agoston and Csubela.

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